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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, 
INC . , e t al , / 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
e t a l . / 
D e f e n d a n t s a n d 
R e s p o n d e n t s . 
C a s e No. 2 0 5 1 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, TED WILSON, AL HAINES, 
MAX PETERSON AND RICK JOHNSTON 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The f o l l o w i n g a r e p r e s e n t e d : 
1. Are t h e i n d i v i d u a l l y named S a l t Lake C i t y employees 
immune from s u i t under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 4 ( 3 ) and 
( 4 ) , Utah Code A n n . , 1953? 
2. Are A p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s 1 damage c l a i m s b a r r e d by 
g o v e r n m e n t a l immunity unde r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of C h a p t e r 30 of T i t l e 
6 3 , Utah Code Ann.? 
3 . Are t e m p o r a r y c l o s i n g s of p u b l i c s t r e e t s , f o r r e p a i r s 
and fo r u s e a s t e m p o r a r y f l o o d w a t e r d r a i n a g e , compensab le 
" t a k i n g s " of a b u t t i n g p r o p e r t y owners a l l e g e d r i g h t s of i n g r e s s 
and e g r e s s ? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Is the act of excavating through the top of a storm 
drainage conduit (which has become plugged as a r e s u l t of flood 
washed debris) a compensable "taking" of abutt ing landowner's 
r i gh t s of ingress and eqress? 
5. Have the Appellant-Corporations la id an adequate 
foundation to meet evidentiary requirements, required by Rule 
56(c) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for use of 
sundry "reports" appended to t h e i r b r i e f? 
6. Even assuming s a i d " r e p o r t s " a r e i n e v i d e n c e , do t h e y 
c o n t a i n m a t e r i a l d i s p u t e d f a c t s j u s t i f y i n g a remand? 
I I 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In t h e S p r i n g of 1983 , an u n s e a s o n a b l e warm s p e l l m e l t e d 
heavy snowpacks i n t h e d r a i n a g e a r e a s s u r r o u n d i n g S a l t Lake 
C i t y . In t h e C i t y Creek Canyon d r a i n a g e , r u n - o f f f lows exceeded 
by two hundred p e r c e n t p r e v i o u s h i s t o r i c h i g h s and approached o r 
exceeded t h e 1 0 0 - y e a r f l ood s t a g e l e v e l s . The c a s c a d i n g t o r r e n t s 
o t wate1" washed h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of t o n s of d e b r i s i n t o t h e 
s t o r m d r a i n s , e v e n t u a l l y c l o g g i n g t h a t s y s t e m . Water bubb led up 
t h r o u g h manhole c o v e r s o n t o Nor th Temple S t r e e t and flowed o v e r 
t h a t s t r e e t i n a s andbanaed c h a n n e l t o t h e J o r d a n R i v e r . 
The f l o o d w a t e r was e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e p u b l i c 
r i g h t s - o f - w a y by s a n d b a g g i n g ; l a t e r , most of t h e f lood w a t e r s 
were d i v e r t e d down S t a t e S t r e e t t h r o u g h t h e c e n t e r of t h e C i t y . 
Meanwhi le , C i t y c rews and i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r s were h i r e d t o 
- 2 - • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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clean out the drainage system on North Temple S t ree t . Some of 
the conduit was cleared by cleaning out the p ipe , but 
approximately two blocks of the pipe was made useable by excavat-
ing through the top. Thus, City Creek was diverted back into i t s 
h i s t o r i c drainage channel? however, for approximately a two-week 
period, North Temple S t ree t was covered with water and debris and 
was unavailable for vehicular or pedest r ian t r a v e l . 
Following tha t two-week period, there was an open channel, 
approximately 7 fee t wide in the center of North Temple S t r ee t , 
which divided t r a f f i c on e i t h e r s ide and acted as a ba r r i e r to U-
turns and some t r a f f i c movement. However, a t a l l times following 
the i n i t i a l two-week per iod, abutt ing property owners had egress 
to t he i r p rope r t i e s , u n t i l f u l l r epa i r s were completed. 
Appellants (abutt ing North Temple St ree t property owners) 
i n s t i t u t e d s u i t , claiming damages by interference with t h e i r 
business operat ions. The respondents (State and local govern-
ments and employees) f i led motions for summary judgment, 
supported by a f f i d a v i t s . The Honorable Judge, Phi l ip R. F i sh ie r , 
granted Salt Lake C i ty ' s Motion for Summary Judgment, together 
with s imi lar ones by the State of Utah and Sal t Lake County. 
I l l 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
R e s p o n d e n t s ( S a l t Lake C i t y and i t s employees ) t a k e i s s u e 
w i t h t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' ( h e r e i n a f t e r c o l l e c t i v e l y c a l l e d " A p p e l l a n t -
C o r p o r a t i o n s " ) S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g 
- 3 -
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f ac t s are se t for th as more accurately s ta t ing the material 
undisputed facts of record, when viewed in a l igh t most favorable 
to Appellant-Corporations: 
1. The individual respondents (Ted L. Wilson, Al Haines, 
Max Peterson and Rick Johnston) were employees of Sal t Lake City 
Corporation. All of the matters of t h i s su i t r e l a t e to t h e i r 
o f f i c i a l ac ts or alleged omissions to a c t , occurring in the scope 
of t he i r employment. (Appellant-Corporations1 Complaint, R-2). 
2. Appellant-Corporations' complaint seeks redress for 
damages from the 1983 flood from the purported loss of business 
access because North Temple S t r e e t , was used temporarily as a 
flood channel. (Appellant-Corporations' complaint, R-8 to 12.) 
3. North Temple St ree t i s a State Highway. Sal t Lake City 
has no legal r igh t or duty concerning i t s maintenance, operat ion, 
or t r a f f i c con t ro l . (Depo. Blaine Kay, p . 33, R-585.) 
4. North Temple S t ree t i s par t of the or ig ina l drainage 
system of City Creek Canyon; as ear ly as 1888, i t car r ied City 
Creek water to the Jordan River. (Affidavit of Rick Johnston and 
Max Peterson, R-65.) 
5/ In approximately 1910, a culver t replaced the open canal 
or stream bed of City Creek in North Temple S t ree t . Said culver t 
was completed by Salt Lake City in approximately 1925. (Affi-
davit of Rick Johnston and Max Peterson, R-65; Sal t Lake C i ty ' s 
Answers to In t e r roga to r i e s , R-156, 157.) 
- 4 -
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6. The North Temple cu lver t was properly designed to 
accommodate reasonably an t ic ipa ted flood-stage flows. (Depo. 
Terry Holzworth pp. 40-41, R-581. 1 ; C i t y ' s Answers to I n t e r r o -
g a t o r i e s , R-166). 
7. As of 1982, Salt Lake County assumed countywide 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over flood control and drainage systems. Pursuant 
to Sta te enabling power and County-wide property tax assessments, 
i t adopted Section 7-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Sal t Lake 
County. (Affidavit of Rick Johnston and Max Peterson, R-66; 
Section 7-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
copied in Appendix 1? Depo. Terry Holzworth, pp. 14, 30 R-581.) 
8. Notwithstanding the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the County and 
S t a t e , as a volunteer , Sal t Lake City inspected the conduit p r io r 
to the 1983 Spring runoff. The City observed that water was 
flowing freely and without apparent obst ruct ion into the Jordan 
River. I t suggested tha t Sal t Lake County dredge the Memory 
Grove set t lement pond and the Jordan River a t the North Temple 
1 
1Appellant-Corporations' Statements of Fact are unnumbered and 
make direct comparison difficult; however, it generally seeks to 
assert City Creek Canyon drainage had a 100-year history of 
serious spring flooding, of which the governmental entities were 
made aware by federal government studies. Appellant-Corporations 
assert the City, County and State were negligent in addressing 
and accepting undisputed recommendations for necessary repairs 
and construction. These assertions are either not supported in 
the record, are based on exaggerated and inaccurate summaries of 
certain "reports" and include matters which were never admitted 
in evidence. 
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c u l v e r t ou t f low, to minimize blockage and back p r e s s u r e on the 
sys tem. This work was completed by the County, p r i o r to the 1983 
f l o o d . (Af f idav i t of Rick Johns ton and Max P e t e r s o n , R-67; S a l t 
Lake C i t y ' s Answers t o I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , 
R-155-156; Depo. Max P e t e r s o n , p . 19, R-582; Depo. Terry 
Holzworth pp . 43-44, R-581.) 
9. Previous h i s t o r i c f lood s t age flows of the Ci ty Creek 
Canyon d ra inage were in t he magnitude of 150 cubic f ee t per 
second. In the Spring of 1983, the maximum runoff exceeded 3 50 
cubic f e e t per second, more than double the prev ious h i s t o r i c 
h i g h s . These flows were even beyond the 100 y e a r f lood p r o j e c -
t i o n of flows t h a t w i l l occur once every 10 0 y e a r s . (Af f idav i t 
of Rick Johnston and Max P e t e r s o n , R-66; Depo. Max Pe te rson p . 
42, R-582; Depo. Terry Holzworth pp . 39-40, R - 5 8 1 . ) 2 
10. The 1983 spr ing f looding was the product of an 
extremely heavy winter snow accumula t ion , with a wet and cold 
s p r i n g ; t he se c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s were followed by an abrupt 
warming t r e n d , where t empera tu res reached 90 d e g r e e s . These 
Appe l l an t -Corpo ra t i ons sugges t in t h e i r Sta tement of Fac ts t h a t 
flows from City Creek Canyon were in the magnitude of 250 cubic 
f e e t pe r second ( c f s ) . (Amended Br ief , p . 17.) They c i t e as 
a u t h o r i t y for t h i s themselves i p s e t d i x i t . [Appe l lan t s 1 Amended 
Br ie f , p . 3 , c i t i n g R-492, which i s Appe l l an t s 1 Reply Brief to 
t h e C i t y ' s Memorandum Support ing i t s Motion for Summary 
Judgment.] Mr. Holzworth a c t u a l l y t e s t i f i e d concerning peak flow 
measurements, as opposed to d a i l y ave rages , had been in the range 
of 350 c f s . Mr. Holzworth t e s t i f i e d : Depo. of Terry Holzworth, 
pp . 39, 40 R-581, which pages a r e a t t a c h e d in Appendix 2. 
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combined fac tors cause a rapid snow melt and extensive flooding 
throughout Sal t Lake County. In the City, t h i s flooding and 
associated problems resul ted in the City declaring an emergency, 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 10-6-129 Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended, and applicable City ordinances. (Exhibit "B" 
of Affidavit of Rick Johnston and Max Peterson, R-76; Depo. Al 
Haines a t p . 10, R-584. 
11. As volunteers to County flood control e f fo r t s , the City 
marshaled i t s resources to avoid the flood waters from inundating 
p r iva te property on North Temple and in the Central Business 
D i s t r i c t . This e f fo r t included sandbagging and diking s t r e e t s , 
pressur iz ing the drainage systems through placing sandbags on 
manhole covers, and u t i l i z i n g City crews to clean grates and 
clean-out boxes. (Affidavit of Rick Johnson and Max Peterson, R-
67? Depo. Max Peterson pp. 13-14, R-582.) 
12. Because of the 100 year flood stage waters pouring from 
the canyons a t t e r r i f i c v e l o c i t i e s , extensive errosion occurred. 
The flood waters washed hundreds of tons of debr i s , sand, rocks 
and d i r t in to the conduit , which ul t imately plugged the drainage 
system about May 29, 1983. Vir tual ly the en t i r e flow was 
diverted down State St ree t June 4 to allow work on North 
Temple. (Sal t Lake C i ty ' s Answers to In t e r roga to r i e s , R-159-160; 
3^ 
Appellant-Corporations incorrec t ly s t a t e tha t the C i ty ' s 
declara t ion was made under the S t a t e ' s Disaster Act (Appellants ' 
Amend 2d Brief, p. 3. 3eo discussion in Point IB
 f supra. ; 
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Affidavit of Rick Johnston and Max Peterson, R-66-67; Depo. Terry 
Holzworth pp. 44-45, R-581; Depo. Max Peterson, p. 34, R-582). 
13. The clog in North Temple Street conduit was determined 
to be over 200 feet long and very compact. High pressure water 
hoses were utilized, along with augering, drag lines and buckets, 
and blasting. Finally, the cap of the culvert was removed in an 
area about two blocks long to dig the debris from the top and 
allow the return the water into its normal drainage bed and 
channel. (Depo. Al Haines pp. 10-21; R-584; Depo. Max Peterson 
pp. 20-28, 49-55, R-582; City Answer to Interrogatories, R-159-
160). 
14. On June 11th, the flow was diverted back into the North 
Temple drainage, part of which flowed on the surface, until it 
was entirely put back into the conduit on or about the 15th or 
16th of June. (Depo. of Max Peterson pp. 34, 71-73, R-582; Depo. 
of Al Haines 39-40, R-584).4 
15. As soon as the flood stage subsided, clean up opera-
tions began. Thus, appellant-Corporations were provided access 
to their businesses within 24 hours after the water was put back 
4Appellant-Corporations assert that had a drag-line bucket not 
been used, the entire pipe could have been augered out within a 
week, without "disturbing the surface of the road or interfering 
with appellants1 business operation." (Appellants1 Amended Brief 
at p. 4, 5.) There is no paginated reference of record for this 
gratuitous statement. In fact, it is not supported by the record 
or evidence of this case or any reasonable inference to be drawn 
from evidence admitted in evidence• 
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into the conduit by June 16, 1983. Thereafter, approximately two 
blocks of the conduit was maintained as an open canal near the 
center of North Temple; however, access was available on either 
side of the barricaded open drainage. (Depo. Max Peterson p. 40, 
63, 966, R-582; Depo. Al Haines pp. 39-40, R-584). 
16. At all times the work was done to the satisfaction of 
the Utah Department of Public Transportation, who considered that 
the flood management and street work was done with extraordinary 
care, skill and expedition, considering the exigent circum-
stances.5 (Depo. Blaine Kay pp. 22, 24, 34-35, R-585). 
17. At all times relevant to the within action, the Utah 
Department of Transportation approved and authorized the use of 
North Temple Street as an emergency drainage area for the 1983 
flood waters. The Department also authorized and approved the 
traffic markings and barricades to route traffic around the open 
drainage channel in the center of North Temple, durinq the County 
repair. (Depo. Blaine Kay pp. 5-8, 33-35, R-585; Affidavit of 
DAppellant-Corporations have asserted that "No written permit" 
was issued as required by statute. It is true that under the 
exigent circumstances, no "wr itten" permit was requested or 
deemed required by the Department of Transportation and, 
therefore, none was issued. However, Mr. Kay clearly stated that 
permission was granted by the Department. (Cf. Appellant-
Corporations1 Statement of Facts in their Amended Brief at p.5). 
^Appellant-Corporations assert that the trench created a traffic 
hazard "materially" interfering with rights of inqress and left 
"extensive debris" on Appellants1 property. (Appellants1 amended 
brief, at p. 5). No reference to the record is supplied for that 
factual assertion/ out at oral argument on the City's Motion to 
Strike their brief, counsel for appellants asserted that they 
(footnote continued) 
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Rick Johnston and Max Peterson, R-68; City Answer to Interroga-
tories, R-246) 
18. Even prior to the City successfully containing the 
flood water on North Temple back into its natural channel about 
June 18, 1984, Salt Lake County retained Montgomery Engineers to 
coordinate and plan for flood repair and system restoration. 
Following the City Creek water containment within the conduit 
channel, the City was no longer involved in assisting the County 
in repairing North Temple drainage system. (Affidavit Rick 
Johnston and Max Peterson, R-16 6; Depo. Terry Holzworth p. 35, R-
581; City Answer to Interrogatories, R-246, 247). 
±9. Salt Lake County let a contract to the engineering firm 
of James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers, who were designated 
the County project managers to expedite flood repair and 
restoration work and a contract was let to Four Way Excavating to 
repair and replace the North Temple on about September 4, 1983. 
The repair work was completed about November 4, 1983, as soon as 
possible considering all the damage in the county. (Depo. Terry 
were relying on the affidavit of Barry Sine. That affidavit of 
Mr. Sine does not appear of record and this writer has no such 
document in his files (cf. R-l5 with Appellants1 "8"). However, 
even assuming it was of record, the statement merely says that 
the obstructed storm drain system allowed water to escape onto 
his property and deposited mud and debris. There is no allega-
tion or facts of record that the City "took" appellants' property 
for a staging area or that it deposited debris on it. Rather, 
the evidence is directly to the contrary. (Depo. Max Peterson, 
pp. 72-73, R-582). 
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Holzworth pp. 45-46f R-581; Affidavit of Rick Johnston and Max 
Petersonf R - 6 8 ) . 
IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. SALT LAKE CITY AND ITS EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The individually named employees of Salt Lake City and the 
City are immune from l iabi l i ty . (Sections 63-30-3 and 63-30-
4(3), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as interpreted by Madsen v. Borthickf 
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
However, even if Section 63-30-3 were not applicable, 
Appellant-Corporations' claims flow from allegations that certain 
studies conducted in the 1970fs suggested that the storm drain 
system could be improved, if additional detention basins were 
constructed. The decision to build or not to build a larger 
flood control system and the amount of tax resources to be 
expended on It are "discretionary functions" protected under 
governmental immunity. Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
interpreted by Madsen v. Borthick, Id. 
Similarly, Appellant-Corporations' argument that immunity 
has been waived because there was a dangerous or defective 
condition in a storm sewer system is misplaced. The claimed 
defects do not go to a "structural" condition of the system. 
Rather, Appellants' claims go to management of the flood (which 
they assert was negligently done) or to a suqgestion that 
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additional detention basins should have been added to the system 
for the storm that may occur once every 10 0 years. Such opera-
tional aspects or enlargement decisions under the facts of this 
case are not covered within the design defect waiver Section 
63-30-9, Utah Code Ann.; thus, immunity from suit remains. 
Further, even if the section were applicable, the 7 year statute 
of limitations for such "defects" has a system completed in 
1925. Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Ann. 
2. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CITY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
COMPENSABLE TAKING. 
The 1983 flood waters were contained within the public 
streets for a period of approximately two weeks. The impairment 
of egress and access to Appellants' property during the flood 
fight was a permitted temporary use for the public good under 
City's police powers. Such temporary obstructions do not 
constitute compensable takings. Springville Banking Co. v. 
Burton, 349 P.2d 157 (Utah, 1960). 
In addition, the two-block-long open drain in the center of 
North Temple Street, which existed for approximately five months, 
allowed vehicular travel on either side of it and, therefore, 
access to Appellants1 property. The minor inconvenience of 
requiring circuity of travel does not constitute a compensable 
taking under Utah law. Holt v. State Road Commission, 511 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1973). 
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3* THE FLOOD OF 1983 WAS AN "ACT OF GOD" AND A "COMMON 
ENEMY", WHICH THE CITY WAS NOT LIABLE AS IT USED ITS POLICE POWER 
TO CONTROL, 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the 1983 flood was an 
unanticipated flood which reached or exceeded the run-off 
expected only once in every 100 years. As such, it was an act of 
God for which no liability can attach to the City. 
Further, under the fact situation of this case, the flood 
waters were a "common enemy". As such, the City was entitled to 
barricade public streets and turn them into channels for 
escorting this "enemy" out of town to the Jordan River under the 
principles in McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah 
1957). The City has no liability for usinq the public rights of 
way in this fashion. 
4. THOSE THEORIES OF "NUISANCE" AND "STRICT LIABILITY" WERE 
NOT PLED IN APPELLANT-CORPORATIONS1 COMPLAINT AND MAY NOT BE 
ARGUED ON APPEAL. 
Appellant-Corporations not only has failed to establish 
sufficient facts to support theories of nuisance and strict 
liability, but they were never pled as theories in their 
complaint? they may not be argued on appeal. Simpson v. General 
Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399 (1970). Further, Section 73-1-8, Utah 
Code Ann, relied upon by appellants does not create strict 
liability? also, it is inapplicable because it has an expressed 
exclusion for the public. 
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5. THE "REPORTS" ANNEXED TO APPELLANTS1 BRIEF WERE NEVER 
RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE AND NO FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR ADMISSION, AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
Appellant-Corporations have made sundry references to 
reports which they annexed to their brief. These documents were 
never received in evidence and no proper foundation was laid. 
They now cannot be used on appeal when they were not properly 
before the lower court. 
However, even if considered, they indicate that (although in 
the Corps of Engineers1 opinion, a detention basin should be 
built), no specific mitigation measures were recommended for the 
City Creek drainage. Further, the ?xisting storm drain system 
was adequate to meet the 100-year level storm and that the 
cost/benefit ratio was such that the U.S. Government would not 
financially participate in any construction projects. At best, 
they are contradictory and do not lay a foundation to overcome 
Utah local government's right to use its discretionary powers to 
decide whether to build or not to enlarge a storm drain system. 
6. ERRONEOUS CITATIONS OF FACT. 
Appellant-Corporations have made many gratuitous "factual" 
statements which, contrary to the Utah Appellate Rules of 
Procedure, are not referenced to the record. In large part, this 
omission appears because there are no record to support the 
"facts" asserted. The matters of record demonstrate that there 
exists no material issue of fact for remand. 
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V 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT-CORPORATIONS1 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS ARE 
EXPLICITLY BARRED UNDER THE ACT. 
Appellant-Corporations named three officers and employees of 
Salt Lake City as parties defendant and sought damages against 
each. (R-12). 
Utah law clearly bars actions against officers and employees 
of local governmental units by requiring that an election be 
made. A plaintiff may sue either to sue the governmental entity 
or the employee—not both. In relevant part it states: 
"The remedy against a governmental entity . . ., after 
the effective day of this actf [is] exclusive of any 
other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the employee . . .f unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud, or 
malice." 63-30-4(3) Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended in 
1983? Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah 1983). 
The Borthick case reaffirmed that an employee could be sued 
in a "representative" capacity if the governmental entity were 
subject to suit. Alternatively, the employer could be sued, if 
he allegedly acted due to fraud or malice. Appellant-
Corporations have not sued these individuals in a "representa-
Borthick also referenced the theory of gross negligence, but a 
1933 amendment deleted that theory from Section 63-30-4, Utah 
Code Ann. 
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t i v e " c a p a c i t y n o r have t h e y sued them f o r " f r a u d " o r " m a l i c e " . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d a f f i r m t h e l o w e r C o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l 
of t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s . 
B . CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY ARE ALSO EXPLICITLY 
BARRED UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A l t h o u g h somewhat r e p e t i t i o u s l y s t a t e d and n o t s e p a r a t e d f o r 
e a c h r e s p o n d e n t - G o v e r n m e n t , a p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s 1 Compla in t 
b a s i c a l l y a l l e g e s f i v e t h e o r i e s on which t o b a s e r e l i e f a g a i n s t 
S a l t Lake C i t y . These a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
1. Salt Lake City negl igent ly designed and ins ta l l ed the 
North Temple conduit between 1910 and 1925. (See, paragraphs 20, 
30 and 31 of appel lant-Corporat ions 1 Complaint, R - l l ) . 
2. Sal t Lake City negl igent ly repaired or maintained the 
North Temple storm drain cu lver t , which proximately caused 
appel lant -Corpora t ions ' injury due to a lack of business access 
to t h e i r p roper t i e s for approximately two weeks during the 1983 
flood. (See paragraphs 20, 30 and 31 of appel lant-Corporat ions 1 
Complaint, R-6, 11). 
3. Sal t Lake City was negligent in fa i l ing to control flood 
waters which inundated North Temple S t r e e t , causing in terference 
with business access to the appel lant-Corporat ions1 property. 
(See, paragraph 30 of appel lant-Corporat ions 1 Complaint, R - l l ) . 
4. After cu t t ing an approximately 7 foot wide drainage and 
2 blocks long t rench, Salt Lake City i n s t a l l e d t r a f f i c control 
devices. These devices barricaded tha t open canal anc, thereby, 
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prevented l e f t hand turns and caused some impediment to business 
access to appel lant -Corporat ions ' businesses. These ac t s 
cons t i tu ted a "taking"of r i g h t s of ingress and egress in a public 
s t r e e t . (See, paragraphs 22 and 23 of appellant-Corporat ions1 
Complaint, R-7). 
5. Salt Lake City fa i led to res to re ingress and egress to 
p l a i n t i f f s 1 business property. This cons t i tu ted a "taking" under 
federal and s t a t e cons t i t u t i ona l provis ions , and breached a duty 
imposed by Section 73-1-8, Utah Code Ann., 1953. (See, para-
graphs 15 and 24 of appel lant-Corporat ions 1 Complaint, R-5, 6, 
8) . 
All appel lant-Corporat ions 1 claims against Sal t Lake City 
deal with management, cons t ruc t ion , repa i r of flood systems or 
flood waters. Thus, a l l claims are barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Spec i f ica l ly , t ha t Act s t a t e s tha t the management 
of flood waters i s to be considered a governmental function for 
which no l i a b i l i t y may a t t ach . The law provides, in re levant 
p a r t , as follows: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in t h i s chapter , 
a l l governmental e n t i t i e s are immune from su i t for any 
injury which r e s u l t s from the exercise of a governmental 
function . . . The management of flood waters and the 
const ruct ion, r e p a i r , and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental e n t i t i e s are considered to be 
governmental funct ions, and governmental e n t i t i e s and 
t h e i r off icers and employees are immune from su i t for 
any injury or damage resu l t ing from those a c t i v i t i e s . " 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. , 1953, as amended 
(Emphasis added);"3 See a l so , Sections 63-30-2(2) and 
(3^ defining "governmental ent i ty ' 1 to include a Utah 
c i ty . ^ 
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Appellant-Corporations attempt to counter this clear bar to 
their claims by asserting that governmental immunity is unavail-
able by virtue of the Disaster Recovery Act of 1981. (Appel-
lants1 Amended Brief, p. 8). However, appellants incorrectly and 
misleadingly lump all of the governmental entities together under 
the Disaster Act. .It must be noted that the State has a 
materially different role under that Act than its political 
subdivisions, and the Appellant-Corporations1 citations inappro-
priately refer to sections of that Act that apply only to the 
governor of the State. For example, Section 63-5a-3, cited by 
appellants, clearly applies only to the governor; it states: 
"In addition to any other authorities conferred upon the 
governor, the governor during the declared state of 
emergency is authorized and empowered to: . . ." 
(emphasis added) 
°The amendment to this section was passed in January, 1984, as 
Senate Bill No. 97. Its purpose is to clarify the meaning of the 
earlier enactment and applies to pending actions. See State 
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 556 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah, 
19 82). 
9There is no authority cited by Appellant-Corporations for the 
proposition that roadways cannot be utilized in the exigent 
circumstances, similar to the Spring runoff of 1983, as a conduit 
for floodwatars or that such use of the public rights-of-way 
constitutes a "taking" of rights of ingress or egress. The case 
°f Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, cited 
by appellants at p. 7 of their Brief, does not so hold. (That 
case is miscited at page 7 of Appellant-Corporations1 brief; the 
correct citation is 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.Ed. 976 [1897]). Chicago 
affirmed the award of a one dollar nominal damage as just 
compensation for the government taking, through its power of 
eminent domain, part of a right-of-way belonging to the railroad 
to put a public street across it. That case is obviously 
distinguishable. 
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Further, the quote at the top of page 8 of appellants' Amended 
Brief is not from that section, but from Section 53-5a-8(3). 
Again, that section applies only to the governor and states: 
"Upon proclamation of a 'state of emergency1, the 
governor may purchase or lease public or private 
property for public use*" (emphasis added) 
Those sections have nothing whatsoever to do with local 
government entities. Further, on their face they deal with the 
power of the governor under a state of emergency to summarily 
acquire or lease private property for a disaster. It does not 
apply to the use of public streets for the containment of flood 
waters. Further, the Act explicitly states it does not apply to 
those kinds of exigent circumstances; it excludes payment for: 
" . . . The destruction or damage of . . . property in 
order to provide a fire break or to the release of 
waters or the breach of impoundments in order to reduce 
pressure or other danger from actual or threatened 
flood.: Section 63-5a-8(4), Utah Code Ann., 1953, (2nd 
Replacement Vol. 7A, 1983 Pocket Supp.) 
More importantly to Salt Lake City, none of the sections 
cited by appellants deal with local government. Section 63-5a-6 
deals with the declaration of local emergencies and authorizes 
them to be declared by the executive officer for a period of not 
to exceed 30 days. This section provides that such a declaration 
constitutes an "official recognition" that a disaster situation 
exists; then the declaration serves as a legal basis for request-
ing and obtaining State and Federal disaster assistance. 
Contrary to the assertion of Appellant-Corporations, that statute 
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has nothing to do with authorizing local government to seize 
private property or impose any obligations of payment. 
Appellant-Corporations have also urged that this Immunity 
law for floods constituted an ex post facto law; however, its 
purpose is clearly to clarify the meaning of earlier immunity 
statutes and applies to pending actions. See, Dept. of Social 
Services v. Hicks, 656 P.2d 889, 1001 (Utah 1982); see also Foil 
v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979); Boucofski v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pac. 119 (1909); Vealey v. Cleqg, 579 
P.2d 119, 920 (Utah 1978). Further, the ex post facto argument 
is inapplicable because ex port facto defenses apply only to 
criminal or penal matters. Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax 
Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 (1943); Mecham v. State 
Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 321, 410 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1966). 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted, that Salt Lake City is 
immune from suit for any injury resulting from its activities in 
managing the flood waters of 1933. 
C. EVEN IF THE CITY WERE NOT EXPLICITLY IMMUNE FOR 
FLOOD CONTROL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ACT, THE 
MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND SUPERVISION OF 
TRAFFIC AND STREET CONSTRUCTION ARE EXERCISES OF 
POLICE POWERS; AS SUCH, THEY ARE GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS FOR WHICH THE CITY IS IMMUNE UNDER 
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
Even if that newly adopted clarification of legislative 
intent discussed in "B" above is not held applicable or control-
ling, the acts of the City are still immune from liability. 
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This Court has had several recent occasions to interpret 
Section 63-30-3. When a patron sued a city for an injury 
sustained on a municipally owned public golf course, this Court 
held that the operation of a public golf course was not a 
"governmental function" within the purview of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Its reasoning was as follows: 
"Governmental functions of a municipality generally are 
those which are essential to its existence as such in 
the sense of serving the public at large, as 
distinguished from those which are private, which are 
not necessary to its existence and which inure to the 
advantage of its inhabitants." Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Utah, 1980); (citations 
omitted and emphasis added). 
Similarly, in 1981, the Court held that a city was not immune 
from liability for providing recreational opportunities when a 
child's sled collided with a timber implanted in concrete at a 
municipally owned golf course. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
629 P.2d 432, 434, (Utah 1981). Again, in 1982, this Court ruled 
that a City was not protected by governmental immunity for damage 
sustained when water backed in sewer system. The court concluded 
that the collection and disposal of sewage was not covered by 
governmental immunity because it lacked unigueness and was net a 
"core governmental function." Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
Later, in a unanimous decision, this Court clarified its 
direction with respect to governmental immunity. Madsen v. 
3crthick, 653 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). In Borthick, this Court 
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vigorously stated that the immunity doctrine was alive. It, 
specifically, held governmental immunity to be constitutional and 
reaffirmed that immunity for "discretionary" governmental 
functions has not been waived by the Act. With regard to 
"governmental functions," this Court withdrew from dicta in 
Standi ford, Johnson, and Clearfield, which some suggested barred 
the immunity defense, if (under any conceivable basis) the 
activity could be performed by a non-governmental entity. In 
rejecting this interpretation of previous rulings, the Court held 
that governmental immunity was not precluded just because the 
function could also be performed by a private entity. Thus, this 
Court held that the State's supervision of financial institutions 
was a "governmental function", regardless of the fact that the 
accounting and auditing aspects of that job could have been done 
by private enterprise. 
The public responsibility of regulating and supervising the 
banking industry was held to be a unique service to protect the 
public at large; it was a discretionary regulatory function at 
the "core" of governmental activity. This Court specifically 
held: 
"Publicly provided sewer services and privately sewer 
services can be essentially the same. But governmental 
supervision of financial institutions in the public 
interest, which includes the exercise of discretionary 
powers delegated by law, and private oversight by 
voluntary association of businesses are qualitatively 
different. The former can be performed only by a 
government agency. Thus, unlike the provision of sewer 
services, the governmental activity in this case 
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qualifies as a "governmental function". Madsen v. 
Borthick, Id. at 6 31. 
In the present case, the activities of Salt Lake City in 
managing the floodwaters and supervising traffic and street 
construction are similar and analogous to governmental 
supervision of financial institutions in the public interest. 
Both constitute the exercise of police powers to protect the 
general citizenry. Both involve the use of discretionary powers, 
delegated by law, and the allocations of scarce governmental 
resources to protect against disaster or calamity—one being 
financial and the other being physical. 
Neither involve (what some consider optional luxuries of 
government) of providing recreational services or managing 
enterprises often organized as profit-making entities. Rather, 
both involve traditional and historic roles of government. In 
Borthick, the government's role was supervising, on the public's 
behalf, financial institutions. In the instant case, the City 
was managing, to the extent possible, the rampaging forces of 
nature to protect the public. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the activities 
of Salt Lake City were unique services to protect the public at 
large. They were discretionary regulatory functions at the core 
of governmental activity, despite the fact that some of these 
activities could arguably have been performed by private 
entities. Thus, they are immune under the Borthick ratioi ale. 
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Consistent with the above reasoning is a substantial body of 
case law affirming that the management of floodwaters is a 
governmental function for which the governing body is immune from 
liability. The commentators note that liability may exist for 
negligent maintenance and repair of a drainage system, which 
allows the water to escape onto private property (contrary to the 
facts in the within action), unless the floodwaters were from 
unanticipated and extraordinary conditions. For example, one 
treatise states: 
"If the municipality undertakes to confine the stream to 
a covered channel or to change the water to a new 
course, it is bound to see the channel provided is at 
least equal to the old one, although it may not be 
liable for damaoe from unprecedented floods . . . It 
ii m i i i rfTln .1 _ __n___Mv.«__ «i__MM__MM__M__M.____iiBM_M. 
has been held in this connection that the municipality 
is not bound to keep the stream so used free from 
obstructions." 6 7 Am.Jur.2d "Construction, Maintenance 
and Use of Sewers, Drains, or Waters in Waterways" § 237 
at 204, 205. 
This treatise also notes: 
"The construction, improvement and maintenance of 
highways, streets and bridges are embraced within the 
police power of the state, and are generally regarded as 
involving, in most respects, the exercise of a 
governmental function, whether done by the state 
directly or by subordinate agency." 39 Am. Jur. 
"Highways" §64 at 452. (Emphasis added). 
"Public travel on a street or other highway may be 
temporarily suspended for a necessary or proper purpose, 
or under particular circumstances, as, for example, in 
case of fire. . . . It has also been held that _a_ 
municipality has a right temporarily to close by 
suitable barriers a street or other public way when it 
is deemed advisable by the municipal authorities to do 
j3p in order to preserve peace and quiet and prevent 
disorder, and chat it may exercise this right 
independent of ordinance, whenever, in the judgment of 
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txhe authorized officials, the peace, quiet, and order of 
the municipality demand that it be done. Id, at 513 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that in the present case, 
the management of flood waters, control of traffic, and super-
vision of street construction during the flooding emergency are 
governmental functions for which Salt Lake City is immune from 
liability, within the meaning of Borthick and Section 63-30-3,,, 
Utah Code Annotated, 195 3, as amended. 
D. THE ACTIVITIES OF SALT LAKE CITY IN DESIGNING, 
CONSTRUCTING, INSPECTING OR REGULATING THE NORTH 
TEMPLE CONDUIT ARE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS FOR 
V7HICH IMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED. 
1. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION. 
It is the general rule that municipalities have jno^  
obligation to provide storm drains and sewers. This is noted as 
follows: 
"In accord with the general rule that municipal 
corporations have no obligation to provide sewers and 
drains, there is ordinarily no duty on the part of 
municipal corporations to provide drainage for surface 
water « . . there is authority to the effect that after 
a municipality has constructed a sewer or drain for the 
purpose of carrying off surface water, it may, in its 
discretion, wholly abandon or discontinue it, and that 
if the municipality in so doing does not leave 
individuals in any worse condition than they would have 
been if such sewer drain had never been made, the 
municipality will not be liable . . . A mun icipal 
corporation is not liable, however, to the owner of 
private property for gathering surface water within its 
limits and carrying it along the natural course of 
drainage and casting it upon such property, if the water 
would have reached the point where it was discharged 
without artificial interference, although it would not 
have done so as quickly as it does through the sewer. 
Nor is a municipality liable, because, due to changes 
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made by the corporation, the water is discharged into 
the natural channel at one, rather than several 
points." 6 7 Am.Jur . 2d "Construction, Maintenance and 
the Use of Sewers, Drains, or Waters and Waterways", 
§238 at 205-207 (Emphasis added). 
The treatise summarizes: 
"Since a municipality is under no obligation to provide 
drainage for surface water naturally flowing over the 
lands of its citizens, it is generally held that under 
like circumstances if it undertakes to drain the surface 
water into sewers, it is not liable for damages caused 
by their insufficiency unless such damages are held to 
come within the same statutory provisions authorizing 
the recovery, such as the provisions for liability for 
injury to property from defects and streets or by reason 
of mismanagement of anything under the control of the 
municipality." JCdL §239 at 208 (Emphasis added). 
Based on the above authority, it is clear that the 
construction and design of the North Temple conduit were 
discretionary governmental functions to which immunity applies 
and for which no duty was breached in decisions on sizing and 
scale. The applicable Utah Immunity Law provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
"(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed when the scope of 
his employment except if the injury: (a) arises out of 
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused . . . " Section 63-30-10, Utah Code 
Ann. , 1953, as amended (Emphasis added). 
Since the City, in its discretion, need not have provided 
any storm drainage system, it follows that it cannot be liable 
for allegations of inadequate sizing, particularly under the 
facts of the present case, where che conduit had proved adequate 
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from 1892 until the unanticipated and extraordinary runoff of 
1983f which more than doubled all historic flows. u 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the design and 
construction of the North Temple conduit were discretionary 
governmental functions to which immunity applies or for which no 
liability attaches as a matter of law. 
2. FAILURE TO INSPECT, OR INADEQUATE OR 
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION OF PROPERTY 
Since Salt Lake County assumed county-wide jurisdiction over 
flood control and drainage systems pursuant to Section 7-2-1 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, the City was under no 
obligation to inspect the North Temple conduit. However, the 
evidence is unrebutted that Salt Lake City did make a careful 
inspection of the North Temple culvert. The City checked the 
culvert by viewing it through open manholes west of 600 West on 
North Temple Street during 19 82, prior to the flood, and when 
stubbing occurred to the conduit during a construction project. 
No defects were discovered and none existed. 
1
 The evidence is unrebutted the design of the North Temple 
culvert was not defective. (See, Statement of Fact No. 7.) In 
any event, a defective design did not clog the system. Rather, 
the system was clogged by unprecedented runoff washing hundreds 
of tons of debris, sand, rocks and dirt into the conduit. (See, 
Statement of Fact No. 13.) Appellant-Corporations1 argument to 
the contrary seems to be that the City had a duty to build deten-
tion basins and other structures, that were not even cost justi-
fied under federal standards. For discussion of the "reports" of 
the U.S. Corps of Engineers as creating a duty to build new 
detention ponds or facilities, see footnote 11, infra. 
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However, even assuming arguendo, that the City had not 
inspected the culvert or had failed to inspect it adequately, it 
is respectfully submitted that immunity would not be waived under 
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. That 
section provides in relevant part as follows: 
"(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
his employment except if the injury: (d) arises out of 
a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property . 
• . " (Emphasis added). 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Appellant-
Corporations1 complaint regarding negligent inspection should be 
ruled not to state a cause of action, as a matter of law. 
3. LATENT DEFECTS. 
Although Utah law provides that immunity is waived for 
injury from a dangerous or defective condition of any public 
structure or improvement, there is an exception for latent 
defects. The law specifically provides as follows; 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or 
defective condition of any public building, structure, 
dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is 
not waived for latent defective conditions." Section 
63-30-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended (Emphasis 
added). 
A latent defect has been defined as "a defect which 
liSection 63-30-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953; cf. Appellant-
Corpora c ions ' Amended Erief, p. 21. 
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reasonably careful inspection will not reveal." Vincent v. Salt 
Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978), citing Black's Law 
Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968). As noted in Subpoint "1" above, Salt 
Lake City did make a reasonably careful inspection of the North 
Temple culvert, and no defects were discovered. 
More importantly, Appellant-Corporations are not claiming a 
"defective" or "dangerous condition" in the sense of a failure to 
build a system in a workmanlike manner or meeting standard 
engineering or design standards. (See Appellant-Corporations' 
brief, p. 21). They appear to argue that "negligent" management 
of a flood equates to the maintenance of a dangerous condition of 
a "public improvement." No authority is cited for that conclu-
sion, and the City respectfully submits that the intent of the 
legislature is evident that the waiver is limited to apparent 
design or structural defects. This intent is manifest in the 
statute as supplemented by the reservation of immunity for flood 
water management and storm systems in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code 
Ann, discussed in Point IB, supra. 
Regarding the issue of structural adequacy, Appellant-
Corporations have not rebutted the evidence that the system was 
not defectively designed or maintained, other than to opine that 
U.S. Corp of Engineering studies done in the 1970's suggest that 
a flooding risk exists in the City Creek drainage and that 
construction of detention basins is one way of improving the 
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sys tem. i Z (Appellants ' Brief, pp. 18-19). 
Thus, assuming, arguendo, t ha t any defects did e x i s t , i t i s 
As discussed in Fact 7, the evidence i s unrebutted tha t the 
design of the North Temple culvert was not defec t ive . The claim 
of Appellant-Corporations i s t ha t a "study" done in 1973 
suggested t h a t $320,000 in damage was poss ib le , if a worst case 
weather scenario occurred. (See appe l l an t ' s Amended Brief, p . 
3) . However, t h i s same study s t a t e s "snow melts up to the 100-
year frequency can be accommodated by the conduit ." (R-490). In 
addi t ion , a cos t /benef i t analys is of t h i s "preliminary repor t" 
was such t h a t the federal government standards were not met and 
no federal f inanc ia l pa r t i c ipa t i on was poss ib le . (R-494). 
Further , t h i s "report" e x p l i c i t l y s ta ted i t was only 
"prel iminary". (R-496). The "report" fur ther s t a t e d : "no 
spec i f ic mi t iga t ion measures are suggested for t h i s [City Creek] 
dra inage." R-498; See, Depo. of Charles Ca l l , p . 36, 38, 39, 40, 
53, 54, 67, R-586 (emphasis added). Appellants never rebutted 
the testimony of County Flood Director , Terry Holzworth; City 
Engineer Max Peterson; an a s s i s t a n t engineer, Charles Cal l , t ha t 
the storm run-off was caused by unforeseen cl imat ic conditions 
beyond the 100-year storm frequency and t h a t the design was 
reasonable and prudent from an emergency standpoint . I l l u s t r a -
t ive of t h i s cons i s ten t evidence was Terry Holzworth, who s t a t e d : 
"Question: [Cutler] Do you have any problem with the 
es t imate made by the City people t h a t the stream flows [out 
of City Creek Canyon] exceeded by two times previous h i s t o r i c 
highs? 
"Answer: [Holzworth] Even our records would indicate tha t 
we were in t ha t range with the flows t h i s year. 
"Question: [Cutler] Would you charac ter ize t h i s as a flood 
in the 100 year flood stage? 
"Answer: [Holzworth] This was in excess of the 100 
year . . . 
"Question: [Cutler] So City Creek Conduit channel was 
designed to acccmmodate what would be reasonably be 
an t ic ipa ted flood stage flows. 
"Answer: [Holzworth] That i s cor rec t . . ." (emphasis 
added) 
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respectfully submitted that they were latent defects or, in the 
context of appellant-Corporations' claims, were discretionary 
decisions of size and scope of tax expenditure for which immunity 
is not waived. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AS AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY WITH 
RESPECT TO NEGLIGENT DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE NORTH TEMPLE CULVERT ARE BARRED BY THE SEVEN 
YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the 
North Temple culvert was negligently designed or constructed, 
even if any negligence could be proved, because they are barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 78-12-2 5.5 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. That section provides as follows: 
"No action to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the 
person, . . . arising out of the defective and unsafe 
condition of an improvement to real property, nor any 
action for damages sustained on account of such injury, 
shall be brought against the person performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of 
construction or construction of such improvement to real 
property more than seven years after the completion of 
construction." 
This section defines a person to include a corporation or other 
legal entity and, further, provides that the limitation shall: 
" . . . not apply to any person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the 
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring 
the action." 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, it is undisputed that 
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the possession and control of the system at the commencement of 
the flood was vested in and assumed by Salt Lake County, (See 
Statement of Fact No. 8). This is true in that the County had 
assumed county-wide flood control supervision commencing in the 
1960fsr and had specifically assumed control for the operation, 
maintenance and repair of the North Temple system with the 
adoption of its ordinance in June, 1972. Thusf this conduit 
desianed and constructed almost 2 0 years prior to the incident, 
is protected under the seven year statute of limitations. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the recent Utah Supreme 
Court decision which held that this statute of limitations runs 
at the completion of the construction, and not at the time of 
discovery of any negligence. Hooper Water Improvement District 
v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah, 1982). 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs have failed to 
state a claim against Salt Lake City with regard to negligent 
design or construction. Furthermore, plaintiffs are barred by 
the seven year statute of limitations for bringing an action for 
negligent design or construction of the North Temple conduit 
which was completed in 1925. 
POINT III 
IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS TO APPELLANT-CORPORATIONSf 
BUSINESS PROPERTY IS NOT A COMPENSABLE TAKING. 
A major portion of Appellant-Corporations' Complaint deals 
with the fact that for approximately twc weeks, flood waters 
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totally usurped travel on North Temple. Also, following June 18, 
1983, a two block open water channel to the Jordan River, 
approximately seven feet wide, was maintained in the center of 
North Temple Street. The appellants assert that this drainage 
channel required their business patrons to travel a more 
circuitous route because some left turns and U turns were not 
permitted. Appellant-Corporations urge this Court to adopt a new 
theory that use of the public streets constituted a constitu-
tional "taking". 
As early as 1960, this Court held, as a matter of law, that 
the erection of barricades in the center of a street eliminating 
U-turns and left-turns and, thus, limiting access to a public 
street did not create a claim upon which relief could be granted; 
specifically, the Court held those facts not to be a compensable 
taking under eminent domain principles. The Court stated: 
"We espouse the notion that if the sovereign exercises 
its police power reasonably and for the good of all the 
people, when constructing highways, consequential 
damages such as those alleged here, are not 
compensable." Sprinqville Banking Co. v. Burton, et 
al., 349 P.2d 157, 158 (Utah, I960). 
Similarly, this Court also ruled that interference with 
ingress or egress by reason of construction, which impaired 
access, was not compensable; it stated: 
"The law has long been established in this State that 
under those circumstances [highway construction 
impairing access to property] there can be no recovery 
from the State for damages because of the construction 
of a highway may impair or adversely affect the con-
venience of access to property. . . . " Holt v. State 
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Road Commission, 511 P.2d 1286-1288 (Utah 1973); see 
also Bailey Service and Supply Corporation v, State, 533 
P. 2d 882f 883 (Utah 1975). ~See, 39 Am.Jur.2d "Highways" 
§199 at 157, §64 at 452f §64 at 513. 
Decisions of other jurisdictions have likewise so ruled. A 
case from Ohio, nearly on all fours with the instant case, 
involved an alleged interference with a property owner's right of 
ingress to and egress from his business property. The restric-
tion was caused by construction of a concrete divider strip in 
the middle of the street on which the owner's property fronted. 
In suing for damages, he alleged that business customers were 
permitted only right-hand turns and required to travel a 
circuitous route to leave or reach his half of the highway. The 
Court rejected the assertion that the divider constituted an 
actionable taking of rights of ingress and egress. It held: 
"Mere circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created 
to and from real property does not of itself result in 
the legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress 
to and from such property . . . " New Way Family 
Laundry, Inc., v. City of Toledo, 171 Ohio St. 242, 168 
~N.E.2d 885 (1960). See also 10 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations , §3 0.14 7. 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts relating to the 
1983 flood management do not support a theory of inverse 
condemnation of any easement, as a matter of law. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE CITY WERE NOT IMMUNE BY STATUTE, 
APPELLANT-CORPORATIONS CAN DEMONSTRATE NO DUTY 
OWED BY THE CITY UPON WHICH TO BASE THEIR 
LIABILITY CLAIMS. 
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A, THE FLOOD OF 1983 WAS AN "ACT OF GOD" FOR WHICH 
NO LIABILITY MAY ATTACH. 
McQuillin summarizes the law exempting municipalities from 
liability for unanticipated stream flows in the cateqory of an 
"act of God" as follows: 
" . . . there i s no duty to provide for floods so unusual 
and extraordinary as to bring them within the category 
of fan act of God1." 18 McQuillin Municipal 
Corporations §53.134 a t 498. 
In accord with the above p r inc ip le i s Dougherty v. 
Cal i forn ia-Paci f ic U t i l i t i e s Company, 546 P.2d (Utah, 1976). In 
the Dougherty case , an action was f i led against an e l e c t r i c 
u t i l i t y to recover damages for the flooding of p l a i n t i f f ' s home 
by overflow of the u t i l i t y ' s canal during the course of a severe 
ra in and hai ls torm. The t r i a l court entered judgment for the 
p l a i n t i f f ; however, on appeal , the u t i l i t y argued ( in t e r a l i a ) 
t ha t the damage was caused by an "act of God" for which i t could 
not be held l i a b l e . The Court agreed tha t i f the occurrence were 
"an act of God" the u t i l i t y would not be l i a b l e . This Court 
described the "act of God" concept as follows: 
"Whether an occurrence should be so classified as 'an 
act of God1 depends upon whether the storm was of such 
magnitude and severity that it was not reasonably to be 
foreseen and guarded against by the traditional, 
reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances." 
Dougherty v. California-Pacific Utilities Company, 54 6 
P. 2d at 882. 
In the present case, the facts are undisputed that the 
stream flows were of such magnitude and severity that they were 
not reasonably to be foreseen and guarded against by the 
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traditional, reasonable and prudent man under the circum-
stances. Although the North Temple culvert had a maximum 
pressure capacity of about 250 cubic feet per second, which had 
proved sufficient from the time of i t s completion in approxi-
mately 1925 until May, 1983. The stream flows in May and June, 
1983 caused a runoff which at one point measured 360 cubic feet 
per second and doubled previously recorded flows. 4 T h i s r u n o f f 
was t h e p r o d u c t of a l a t e and wet s p r i n g , heavy w i n t e r snow 
a c c u m u l a t i o n s , and a r a p i d and u n a n t i c i p a t e d s p r i n g warming . 
(See S t a t e m e n t of F a c t No. 1 1 . ) 
T h u s , i t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e f l o o d i n g of 1983 
was an " a c t of God" f o r which t h e R e s p o n d e n t - S a l t Lake C i t y may 
n o t be h e l d l i a b l e , a s a m a t t e r of l a w . 
B. THE FLOOD WATERS OF 1983 WERE A "COMMON ENEMY"; 
AS SUCH, THE CONTAINMENT OF THIS ENEMY THROUGH 
THE CITY TO THE NATURAL DRAINAGE OF THE JORDAN 
RIVER EXEMPTS THE MUNICIPALITY FROM ANY 
LIABILITY. 
B e g i n n i n g w i t h e a r l y E n g l i s h l a w , a l e g a l p r i n c i p l e h a s 
e v o l v e d w i t h r e g a r d t o f l o o d i n g c a l l e d t h e "common enemy" 
d o c t r i n e . See 7 8 A m . J u r . 2 d " W a t e r s " §120 , a t 565 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . T h i s 
1,:>See F o o t n o t e 1 1 , s u p r a . 
1
 See Footnote No. 2, supra, for documentation that Appellant-
Corporations' statement that a material disputed issue of fact 
exists as to the water flows from City Creek Canyon. The 
County's measurements are not significantly different from the 
City's and to the extent they disagree, the county admitted their 
measuring devices may have been in error. 
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doctrine provides that flooding, particularly that of an 
extraordinary nature, is a common enemy against which necessary 
measures can be taken to protect one's property, without incur-
ring liability to others. Thus, a landowner has an unqualified 
right, by operations on his own land, to fend off flood waters as 
he sees fit, without being required to consider the consequences 
to other landowners* Id. at 565. Utah recognizes the common 
enemy doctrine and applied it in McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 
Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 (1957). 
I In McKell, the plaintiff sought recovery for damages to his 
farm resulting from flood control measures taken by the upstream 
defendants to control the water. The facts in McKell are similar 
to those of the present case. As in the present suit, there was 
unusually heavy winter snowfall and a late, cold spring; these 
events were followed by unreasonably warm weather, producing 
unprecedented runoff and flooding. The plaintiff was denied 
recovery on the basis of the common enemy doctrine, which the 
Court discussed as follows: 
"However, it is generally recognized that riparian 
owners may embank and protect their lands against the 
overflow of extraordinary floods, even though damage to 
the lands of others is caused thereby. An extraordinary 
flood is one which is not foreshadowed by the usual 
course of nature, and is of such magnitude and 
destructiveness as could not have been anticipated or 
provided against by the exercise of ordinary 
foresight." (citations omitted) Id. at 1099. 
The common enemy doctrine applies to the facts of the 
present case. In the spring of 19S3, the maximum runoff exceeded 
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350 cubic fee t per second, more than double the previous h i s t o r i c 
h ighs , and beyond even the 100-year flood pro jec t ion . Thus, the 
flood of 1983 was indeed ext raordinary , and not in the "usual 
course of na tu re . " Rather than damage o t h e r s , however, in the 
ins t an t case, v i r t u a l l y no water escaped onto p r iva t e property 
and damage i s mostly claimed for impairment of the use of public 
s t r e e t s . 1 5 
Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that the 
inconvenience caused Appellant-Corporations were merely those 
incident to the City using public streets to escort a "common 
enemy" out of town. No duty was breached to appellants and they 
have no claim against the City. 
POINT V 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DEMONSTRATE THAT NO 
"NUISANCE" WAS CREATED OR MAINTAINED BY SALT LAKE 
CITY. 
A p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s have n o t a l l e g e d n u i s a n c e a s a c a u s e 
of a c t i o n i n t h e i r C o m p l a i n t ; however , t h e y a p p e a r t o a s s e r t t h e 
t h e o r y i n t h e i r Amended B r i e f . 1 5 S i n c e i t was n o t a c a u s e of 
a c t i o n a l l e g e d , i t c a n n o t now be r a i s e d on a p p e a l a s g r o u n d s f o r 
r e v e r s a l . Simpson v . G e n e r a l Motors C o r p . , 24 U tah 2d 3 0 1 , 470 
P. 2d 399 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . However, l e s t t h e i s s u e r a i s e some c o n c e r n i n 
t h e C o u r t , i t w i l l be b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d . 
1
^Appellant-Corporations ' Fac ts , Amended Brief, pp. 3-5 and 
Complaint, R-2. 
-^Appellant-Corporations1s Amended Brief, p . 11. 
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The Appellant-Corporations have cited Vincent v. Salt Lake 
County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978), presumably for the proposition 
that nuisance is a basis for liability in the present case. 
However, the Vincent case is clearly distinguishable. In 
Vincent, the county had notice of inadequate construction 
techniques and a lack of caulking which caused water to escape 
the storm system and damage the private property of a citizen 
over many years. Those facts demonstrating a structural defect 
are obviously dissimilar to those of the present case, where 
under the most generous and creative reading of the facts, 
appellants can only assert a single 1983 negligent management of 
the system or that new detention ponds should have been 
constructed. Even that construction of the facts does not meet 
the theory of a "nuisance" cause of action. 
Also, the Andrus case cited by appellants18 has no 
similarity to the facts before the bar. The issue in that case 
dealt with the diversion of rain water causing an impoundment. 
When the banks failed, water was released, which cascaded onto 
the plaintiff's property. It did not involve a storm drain 
system which everyone conceeds was adequate to accommodate 100-
year flood stage levels. 
1
'See discussion in Footnote 11, supra. 
18Andrus v. State of Utah, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975) cited at 
page 11 cf appellants' Amended Brief. 
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F u r t h e r , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t i n A n d r u s f t h e C o u r t 
g r a n t e d an N.O.V. t o S a l t Lake County f h o l d i n g t h a t i t had no 
common-law o r s t a t u t o r y d u t y r e g a r d i n g p r o v i d i n g a s to rm d r a i n 
s y s t e m f o r a S t a t e h ighway . C o n t r a r y t o t h e a s s e r t i o n of 
A p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s , Andrus c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t h o l d t h a t t h e 
r e s p o n d e n t s of t h i s i n s t a n t l a w s u i t a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o a summary 
j u d g m e n t . T h a t c a s e , i n f a c t , u p h e l d a t r i a l j u d g e ' s g r a n t i n g of 
a judgment N.O.V. f o r t h e Coun ty . 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e C i t y ' s u se of t h e s t r e e t , t o 
c o n t a i n t h e f lood w a t e r i n i t s o r i g i n a l d r a i n a g e c h a n n e l and 
c a r r y i t o u t t o t h e J o r d a n R i v e r , was t o t a l l y r e a s o n a b l e . In 
f a c t , i t was n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t f lood w a t e r s from i n u n d a t i n g 
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . Moreover , Nor th Temple S t r e e t was u n a v a i l a b l e 
t o v e h i c u l a r t r a f f i c f o r a p e r i o d of l e s s t h a n two weeks , and t h e 
Utah Depa r tmen t of P u b l i c T r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e work 
done on i t was c o m p l e t e d w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y c a r e , s k i l l and 
e x p e d i t i o n , , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S e e , S t a t e -
ment of F a c t No. 17 . 
POINT VI 
STRICT LIABILITY IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
A p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s a s s e r t t h a t S e c t i o n 7 3 - 1 - 8 , Utah Code 
A n n . , 1953 , imposes s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y on S a l t Lake C i t y f o r any 
s to rm d r a i n w a t e r t h a t e s c a p e s from a Ci ty -owned s to rm d r a i n 
1 Q 
s y s t e m . 
See A p p e l l a n t - C o r p o r a t i o n s ' Amended B r i e f a t p . 12. 
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The writer is somewhat confused as to whether appellants' 
attorney is asserting strict liability under that statute, as 
suggested on page 13 of his Brief, or if he is premising the 
argument on "negligence per se." In any event, the statute does 
not stand for the propositions asserted. 
It does impose a duty on those private persons beneficially 
using water to maintain the water course in good repair, where it 
crosses the public road or highway. However, it contains an 
express exception for public entities. This exception states: 
". . . except where the public maintains or hereafter 
elect to maintain devices for that purpose." Section 
73-1-8, Utah Code Ann., 1953. (emphasis added) 
Clearly, this act does not apply to City-owned storm sewer 
systems.20 
Secondly, appellants1 use of dam failures or impoundment 
release cases"1 are not precedent for the situation in the 
instant case. The case at bar does not involve the knowing 
zuContrary to appellants1 suggestions, the statute does not 
impose strict liability. Case law is consistent that this 
statute is one involving the issue of negligence and the failure 
to exercise "ordinary care" and "prudence" under the circum-
stances. Jensen v. Davis and Weber Countyfs Canal Company, 44 
Utah 10, 137 Pac. 635 (1913); Erickson v. Bennion, 28 U.2d 371, 
503 P.2d 139 (1972). Thus, even if it were applicable, the law 
does not stand for creation of strict liability. 
21See Ryland v. Fletcher, LR 3 H.L. 330, IRC (Eng. 1968); Gossner 
v. Utah Power & Light, 612 P.2d 337, (Utah 1980); Clark-Aiken Co. 
v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass 1975) cited at 
appellants1 Brief pp. 12-13. There are no facts in the instant 
case that any flooding or damage was caused by the release of 
waters impounded by che City. Further, some of the oases do not 
even hold as represented; for example, Gossner v. Utah Power & 
(footnote continued) 
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impoundment release of impounded water at all; rather, at best it 
deals with inability of a storm drain system to accommodate flood 
waters exceeding by two times previous historic highs and 
exceeding the 100-year flood level. 
Lastly, it must be noted by the Court that the issue of 
strict liability is not plead in Appellant-Corporations' com-
plaint* Having failed to have this cause of action before the 
lower court, he should now be able to assert it on appeal. 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., supra. 
In sum, appellants' complaint does not sound or give notice 
to the parties that they were claiming strict liability. The 
cases cited are not similar to the instant case, where there was 
no artificial impoundment of water or negligent release onto 
private land. Further, the statute relied upon expressly exempts 
public bodies. The lower court was correct in granting its 
Summary Judgment. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT-CORPORATIONS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ON 
PAGE 3 TO THE MIDDLE OF PAGE 4 ARE NOT IN 
EVIDENCE AND MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 56(C) (E) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE; SIMILARLY, THE VARIOUS REFERENCES 
THROUGHOUT THE BRIEF TO THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS1 
REPORT IS SIMILARLY TAINTED AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
Light, supra, mentioned strict liability, but premised its ruling 
on issues of negligence. Id. at p. 341. 
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Appellant-Corporations attempt to e s t ab l i sh the factual 
record tha t Sal t Lake City negl igent ly fa i led to heed the advice 
of the United S ta tes Corps of Engineers to pro tec t the public 
from ce r t a in projected peak runoffs from City Creek Canyon. 
56(c) provides tha t a summary judgment may be rendered when 
the : 
". . • pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with affida-
vits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added) 
This rule is augmented by Rule 56(e), which requires that 
opposing affidavits be made on personal knowledge and 
" . . . snail set forth facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Stown or cretified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referr9d to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith." (Emphasis added). 
The rule, further, provides that an adverse party may not rest 
upon mere allegations or denial in the pleading, but must respond 
by affidavit or otherwise as provided in this rule and must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. 
The "reports" referred to by Appellant-Corporations fail to 
meet any of the evidentiary tests required to create an issue of 
fact or to have them considered by the Court. These purported 
"reports" were never introduced in evidence, never properly made 
the subject of judicial notice of and no foundation was laid, 
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entitling them to be received as evidence. Rather, they were 
included in the record as attachments to Appellant-Corporations1 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in the lower court. (R-477-483). 
The same tactic of avoiding evidentiary rules required by Rule 
56(c) and (e) were employed by appellants in this Court when they 
were attached as exhibits to the Appellant-Corporations1 Brief. 
Timely objection was made by Salt Lake City that the matter 
should not be considered, because they were not in evidence and 
no foundation been properly laid. (R-385, 389, 407, 425, 428). 
Without a proper foundation and the matters being admissible 
as evidence, they may not be considered as rebutting a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Rule 56(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Western States Thrift and Loan Company v. Blumquist, 29 U.2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 29 U.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1983). Thus, the 
^In a letter dated August 12, 1985 to Justice Hall, following 
the City's Motion to Strike, counsel for appellants suggested 
that the reports were "Basically" admitted because in Requests 
for Admissions he had asked if certain quoted language was 
contained within identified documents. No attempt was made to 
introduce the "reports" or lay a foundation for them being evi-
dence and no attempt was made by appellants to use the admis-
sions. Salt Lake stands by what those admissions say, but 
objects to suggestions that it admitted the whole "report" not 
made a part of those requests. In a caveat, the City expressly 
stated: " . . . [the quoted language from the U.S. Corps Report] 
has been, in effect, repudiated as not being accurate." It also 
objected that the report had been substituted by the FEMA study 
and was inadmissible for a variety of reasons. (See objections 
and reservations, R-423, 424, 428, 430, 431). 
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"factual" a sse r t ions on pages 3 to the second paragraph of page 4 
may not be considered in t h i s appeal . 
The prejudice involved by Appellant-Corporations ' t a c t i c i s 
not only in the fact they were repudiated by l a t e r repor t s 
because of e r r o r s , 2 3 giving an i l l u s t r a t i o n as to the wisdom of 
requir ing elementary evident iary ru les of foundation to be 
followed, but (also) in Appellant-Corporations1 misstatement as 
to what they say. 
1. Appellant-Corporations a se r t tha t the report supports a 
finding of a 100 year flood h i s to ry causing damages to 
res idences . 2 
Rather than making such a f inding, the "report" merely 
r e c i t e s a 3 hour ra in storm occurring September 11/ 1864, and 
events in 1854, 1874 and 1879. (R-499). All of these events 
occurred a t l e a s t 45 years pr ior to the 1925 completion of the 
North Temple conduit drain system. That h is tory hardly supports 
the suggestion of a 100 year h i s to ry of spring flooding. 
23The document was apparently never adopted. I t s t a t e s : "This 
report i s preliminary and has not been edited or reviewed for 
conformity with U.S. Geological Survey Edi tor ia l Standards of 
Stra t igraph Nomenclature." R-496 (Emphasis added). 
Further , when Appellant-Corporations1 at torney attempted to 
lay a foundation for the repor t in a deposi t ion , the witness 
t e s t i f i e d tha t the document was prel iminary. He stated tha t i t 
was in e r ror and tha t the data had been revised in favor of a 
FEMA repor t . This subsequent repor t indicated tha t the po ten t ia l 
stream flow from City Creek did not even present enough flood 
r i sk to warrant fur ther study. See Depo. of Charles Ca l l , pp. 
36, 38, 39, 40, 53, 54, 67; R-586. Also note tha t Mr. Call i s 
not the City Hydrologist, but an Assis tant City Engineer. 
Appellant-Corporations1 Amended Brief, p. 3. 
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Further, nothing in the report suggests any damages to 
residences below. Rather, it only references these incidents 
which produced mud and debris at the canyon mouth or in North 
Temple Street. (R-472, 475, 478, 479, 490-494, 498-501). 
2. Appellant-Corporations suggest that mitigation is 
required by the reports. The conclusion is apparently asserted 
from the general statement that streams like City Creek, which 
concentrate flows in a narrow canyon discharging into a highly 
developed business district constitute a threat. However, aside 
from the fact that the document was repudiated in favor of the 
subsequent FEMA report, the report states: 
"No specific mitigation measures are suggested for this 
[City Creek] drainage." (R-498). 
For Appellant-Corporations to now suggest the reports 
attached to their memorandum demonstrate issues of fact regarding 
negligence on the part of the City or the County is a gross 
distortion, even if these matters were in evidence and even if 
they had not been subsequently repudiated and amended in tne FEMA 
report conclusions. Virtually every other factual assertion for 
those reports and Appellant-Corporations1 Brief are similarly 
false. 
Appellant-Corporations have failed to comply with Rules 
56(c) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to rebut the 
Summary Judgment motion. Those statments of "fact" not supported 
by the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
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should, likewise, not be considered. Therefore, for reasons 
hereafter articulated, the lower court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
POINT VIII 
THE APPELLANT MAKES SUNDRY FACTUAL ASSERTIONS 
WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD. 
Although voluminous, the number of unsupported factual 
assertions precludes additional discussion to stay within the 
page limit of this Brief. The Court's attention is, however, 
drawn to the fact that there is no paginated reference, as 
required by the Utah Appellate Rules of Procedure, and there 
should be a presumption that they are not supported by the 
record. Some flagrant examples include: 
1. Appellant asserts that City and County were grossly 
negligent in allowing water through the conduit, which resulted 
in the blockage, when that water could have been overflowed on 
the streec for the approximately one-week period of the flood 
duration.25 
RESPONSE: The undisputed facts of record demonstrate that 
the high volame of water washed tons of debris into the conduit 
causing it to be plugged. When the water initially surged over 
the inlet at Memory Grove and, subsequently, was intentionally 
diverted over Memory Grove to run the water down State Street and 
See pp. 14-15 Appellants-Corporations' Brief. 
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allow a r e l a t i v e l y dry period for working on the North Temple 
conduit . Further, ser ious erosion on Canyon Road threatened the 
e n t i r e City by threatening to wash out water and sewer l i n e s . 
This heal th and safety considerat ion was the prime motivation to 
re tu rn the water into the conduit . (R-161, 163). 
2. Appellant-Corporations a s se r t t h a t : 
"Had a drag l ine bucket not been used, the e n t i r e 
sect ion of pipe could have been augered out in a week . 
. . without dis turbing the surface of the road or 
in t e r fe r ing with appe l l an t s ' business ope ra t i on . " 2 6 
RESPONSE: The fac ts demonstrate tha t the road was already 
flooded and cut before and during the augering operat ion. ^ 
^°See Appellants1 Amended Brief, pp. 4-5, and 15. 
27 
*'The first North Temple clogs occurred some time Sunday, May 
19th. The blockage moved eastward; it was necessary to cut holes 
in the conduit to determine the nature and location of the 
blockage. Also, water spewed out of manholes in front of the 
blockage onto North Temple Street, which was contained in the 
street through sandbagging. Depo. of Max Peterson p. 20-2 5, R-
582. The conduit became entirely clogged by the night of June 
3rd, which date water was diverted down State Street. Max 
Peterson Depo. p. 26, 27, R-582. 
During this time, water was run over on North Temple in a 
sandbagged channel which filled the entire road surface. In the 
words of Max Peterson: "[the water] was filling the entire road. 
. . . I think starting the 29th of May until the entire flow had 
been diverted down State Street on the 4th of June where North 
Temple was partially dried out, and then the flow was diverted 
back to North Temple on the 11th of June, and it was flowing on 
the surface until we got it back into the conduit on or about the 
15th or 16th of June." Max Peterson Depo. p. 34, R-582. 
Mr. Helm testified at the time he was augering: " . . . water 
frcm City Creek Canyon was flowing parallel with us down North 
Temple through a sandbag channel." He testified: "No. The 
water was continuous. There might have been short periods when 
it was lessor flow than oiihers, but it was flowing continuously 
while we were working." Helm Depo. pp. 2 5-26, R-583. 
The augering operations require augering pits approximately 
(footnote continued) - 4 ft-
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There is no evidence known to the writer to suggest that the road 
surface could have remained in tact. The drag line was used 
after the blockage occurred, ruts had been made and flooding was 
in progress. 
In addition, it is to be noted that Appellant-Corporations1 
suggestion that certain augering took four days and, therefore, 
the entire section could have been augered out in a week, is 
p o 
unsupported by the record. 
Appellant never asked Mr. Helm if any augering available 
could have avoided the cuts in North Temple, but when respondents 
inquired, Mr. Helm testified: 
"Question: [Cutler] Did you see any of the holes there under 
the totality of the circumstances which were unnecessary or 
unreasonable to be dug by the City?" 
"Answer: [Helm] No." Helm Depo. p. 41, R-583. 
30 feet by 10 feet to a depth below the flow line of the pipe to 
be dug. Helm Depo. p. 5; R-583. These holes must be dug at 
intervals. In the case at bar, the pits used were dug by the 
City and all were necessary. Helms Depo. pp. 5, 7, 12, 41, R-
583. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the City operated 
anything other than reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances. Helm Depo. pp. 41, 42, R-583. 
p o 
"There is nothing in the record to suggest Helm physically could 
have continued augering at that pace. To continue would have 
required working crews more than an additional 72 hours without 
sleep and continue to exceed servicing requirements of equipment, 
in marginal working conditions. Helms Depo. at pp. 26-27, 37, 
41, 42, R-583. The augering equipment had been brought in from 
Colorado and Idaho. R-162. No other equipment was available and 
one augering contractor had been removed because he was too 
slow. Helms Depo. id. at pp. 13, 14; Haines Depo. Id. at pp. 20, 
21. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court's Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of September, 1985. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents Salt Lake City, 
Ted L. Wilson, Al Haines, 
Max Peterson and Rick Johnston 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four copies of each of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondents Salt Lake City Corporation, Ted Wilson, Al 
Haines, Max Peterson and Rick Johnston were mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, this 27th day of September, 1985, to: 
Marcus G. Theodore Paul M. Warner 
Valley Tower, Suite 701 Assistant Attorney General 
50 West Broadway 236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Kevin F. Smith 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Chapter 2 
FLOOD CONTROL FACILITIES AND REGULATION THEREOF * ' 
c t ions : ::,-, / 
7 - 2 - 1 . Permit Required for Use of Flood Control Facilities 
7 -2 -2 . Exemptions 
7 - 2 - 3 . Review of Development Plans 
7 -2 -4 . Obstruct ion of or Damage to Flood Control Facilities 
7 - 2 - 5 . Included Facilities 
7 -2 -6 . Existing Rights 
7 -2 -7 . . Bonding for Performance 
7 -2 -8 . Control b y Board of Commissioners 
Sec . 7 -2 -1 . Permit Required for Use of Flood Control Facilities. It 
nail be unlawful for any person, firm, corporat ion, municipality or distr ict 
D in te r fe re with, cause damage to , des t roy , or use for any purposes any 
iood control , storm drainage, water quality cont ro l , or water conservation 
t r u c t u r e , facility, appur tenance , or any other p r o p e r t y owned, construc-
ed , maintained or controlled by or on behalf of t h e County , as identified 
n S e c . 7-2-5 hereof, without having f i r s t received a writ ten permit from 
.he Division. The Division may impose such t e rms and conditions as may 
:>e necessary to insure the proper maintenance and restorat ion of the p ro-
p e r t y . Application for use of such p roper ty shall be made to the Director 
Df t h e Division and shall sec forth tne par t icular use desi red and the p u r -
pose and duration of usa . Permits shall be revocable when, in the opinion 
of t h e Director of t he Division, the public i n t e re s t and welfare so requires . 
Sec . 7-2-2. Exemptions. The provis ions of t h e above section 
shall no t apply to any entry or use in t he course of du ty by any peace or 
police officer or by a duly-authorized employee of t h e County . 
Sec . 7-2-3. Review of Development Plans . '-JM^t p lans for public and* 
p r i v a t e development tha t will. alter the yiatura1 _f j^^ j f VyurfacsVwater, upop" 
t h e lands " m v c ^ e d T n J s a i d development" shall be submit ted to the^JDivision-
for review' and approval prior to the commencement of work thereon. Plans 
for a development which will drain into a flood control or storm drainage 
facility maintained by a city shall be t he responsibi l i ty of t ha t city and sub -
mission of said plans to the Division shall not be r e q u i r e d . Said city snail 
review such plans to assure compliance with those provisions of Sec. 7-2-1 
here in applicable to city facilities which connect to t hose facilities identified 
in Sec. 7-2-5 here in . The Division may requi re t h e design of erosion and 
sediment control or other measures to protect t h e capaci ty of any flood con-
t rol o r storm drainage facilities or the quality of t h e water flowing through 
any p a r t of the flood control and storm dra inage system as defined in 
Sec . 7 - 2 - 5 . , "Water quality11 or "quality of water11, whenever used herein, 
shall re fer to , and incorporate those definitions and s t anda rds which are se t 
fo r th in the County ls t hen -cu r r en t Water Quality Management Plan, as es tab-
l ishec by the Division-
A - l 
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A Dan Shank? . 
Q Yes/ 
A We're trying to correlate the records. These are 
the two differences I spoke of. The higher numbers on Dan's 
readings and ours we're attempting to correlate.' 
Q You're saying that you measured maximum supreme flow 
as occurring at approximately 347 cubic feet per second? 
A That's correct, and we're trying to establish whether 
or not we had a correct relationship on the reading chart that 
went with that measurement. We reconciled the differences between 
those numbers. 
Q During this period of time then, is it fair to say 
that the water was coming at such velocity that it was difficult 
to measure? •*-•• • 
A ..." Yes, it was. 1 would testify that it might be ' 
difficult to assure the accuracy of any of those gauge readings 
during the peak flow. 
Q They might svsn have exceeded those that you measured? 
A That's right. 
Q Do you have any problem with the estimate made by 
the City people that the stream flows exceeded by two times " 
previous historic highs? . , 
A Even our records, would indicate that we were in that 
range with the flows this year. 
Q Would you characterize this then as a flood in the 
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hundred year flood stage? 
A This is one in excess of one hundred year— 
Q Would you define that term? 
A A one hundred year flood is the quantity of water 
that we might expect statistically that would happen once in a 
hundred years or that we would have a one percent chance of 
exceeding it in a given year. That fluid flow calculated for 
City Creek is more in the order of 180 to 200 cubic feet per 
second. 
Q That's the hundred year velocity? 
'A That would be the hundred year flow rate. 1 don't 
have that to my.direct knowledge, but that has been calculated, 
and we can get testimony for that. 
Q So the City Creek conduit channel was designed to 
accommodate what would be reasonably anticipated flood stage 
flows? 
A That!s_ correct. I would not say that the 160 cubic 
feet par second capacity is a one hundred year design, but it's 
in excess of a fifty year flow. 
Q And you don't have any problem with the design 
capacity for the North Temple drainage system for City Creek? 
A 1 do not. 
Q : Is. that why you didn't, change significantly the 
design features of that in repairing the. design system? 
A That's my first analysis. There is still some 
4„ 
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.~~»~~<~v, — x xauu ni applica-
tion for financial assistance — Penalty. (1) In addition to any other authorities 
conferred upon the governor, the governor during the declared state of emergency 
is authorized and empowered to: 
(a) Utilize all available resources of state government as reasonably necessary 
to cope with a "state of emergency"; 
(b) Employ measures and give direction to state and local officers and agencies 
which are reasonable and necessary for the purpose of securing compliance with 
the provisions of this act and with orders, rules and regulations made pursuant 
to this act; 
(c) Recommend and advise the evacuation of all or part of the population from 
any stricken or threatened area within the state if necessarv for the preservation 
of life; 
(d) Recommend routes, modes of transportation, and destination in connection 
with evacuation; 
(e) In connection with evacuation suspend or limit the sale, dispensing, or 
transportation of alcoholic beverages, explosives, and combustibles, not to include 
the lawful bearing of arms. 
(f) Control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of 
persons within the area, and recommend the occupancy or evacuation of premises 
in a disaster area. 
(g) Clear or remove from publicly or privately owned land or water through 
the use of state departments or agencies, debris or wreckage which may threaten 
public health, public safety, or private property as hereinafter provided: 
(i) Whenever the governor provides for clearance of debris or wreckage pursu-
ant to this subsection, employees of the designated state agencies are authorized 
to enter upon private land or waters and perform any tasks necessary for the 
removal or clearance operation. 
(ii) Authority under this subsection shall not be exercised unless the affected 
political subdivision, corporation, organization or individual shall first present an 
unconditional authorization for removal of such debris or wreckage from private 
property and agree to indemnify the state government against any claim arising 
from such removal. 
(h) Recommend to the legislature additional action he deems necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this act. 
(2) When the governor has proclaimed a "state of emergency" under this act 
and when the president of the United States, at the request of the governor, has 
declared an "emergency" or a "major disaster" to exist in this state, the governor 
is authorized: 
(a) To enter into agreement with any agency of the United States for temporary 
housing units to be occupied by disaster victims and to make such units available 
to any political subdivision of this state. 
(b) To assist any political subdivision of this state to acquire sites and utilities 
necessary for such temporary housing by passing through any funds made available 
to the governor by an agency of the United States for this purpose. 
(c) To temporarily suspend or modify by proclamation, during the period of the 
emergency, any public health, safety, zoning, transportation or other requirement 
of the law or regulation within this stat? if such action is essential to provide tem-
porary housing for disaster victims. 
(d) Upon determination that a political subdivision of the state will suffer a 
substantial loss of tax and other revenues because of a disaster and the political 
subdivision so affected has demonstrated a need for financial assistance to perform 
its governmental functions, in accordance with the provisions of Article XIV, sec-
tions 3 and 4, of the Constitution of Utah, and section 10-8-8, to apply to the federal 
government for a loan on behalf of the political subdivision, and to receive and 
disburse the proceeds to the applicant political subdivision. No application amount 
shall exceed 25 percent of the annual operating budget of the applicant political 
subdivision for the fiscal year in which the disaster occurs. 
(e) To accept funds from the federal government and make grants to any politi-
cal subdivison for the purpose of removing debris or wreckage from publicly owned 
land or water. 
(f) Upon determination that financial assistance is essential to meet disaster 
related expenses of individuals or families adversely affected by a disaster which 
cannot be sufficiently met from other means of assistance, to apply for, accept and 
expend a grant by the federal government to fund such financial assistance, subject 
to the termi ar.d conditions imposed upon the graiiu 
(3) Any person who fraudulently or willfully makes a misstatement of fact in 
connection with an application for finanical assistance under this subsection shall, 
upon conviction of each orTense, be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 
History: L 19S1, ch. 253, § 3. 
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63-5a-6. Local emergency — Declarations. (1) A "local emergency" may be 
declared by proclamation of the principal executive officer of a political subdivision. 
It shall not be continued or renewed for a period in excess of 30 days except by 
or with the consent of the governing body of the political subdivision. Any order 
or proclamation declaring, continuing, or terminating a "local emergency" shall be 
filed promptly with the clerk of the affected political subdivision. 
(2) A declaration of a "local emergency" is official recognition that a disaster 
situation exists within the affected political subdivision and provides a legal basis 
for requesting and obtaining state or federal government disaster assistance. The 
declaration activates the response and recovery aspects of any and all applicable 
local disaster emergency plans and authorizes the furnishing of aid and assistance 
pursuant thereto. 
(3) A "local emergency" proclamation issued under this section shall state: 
(a) The nature of the "local emergency"; 
(b) The area or areas threatened; and 
(c) The conditions which caused the emergency. 
History:. L. 1981, ch. 253, § 6. 
63-5a-8. Acquisition of property for public use — Compensation of owners. 
(1) Upon proclamation of a "state of emergency," the governor may purchase or 
lease public or private property for public use. 
(2) Property necessary for use in such an emergency may include, but is not 
limited to, food and medical supplies, clothing, shelter, means of transportation, 
fuels, oils, buildings or lands, but shall not include private home storage nor pri-
vately owned arms. Such property may be used for any purpose to meet the needs 
of an emergency, including its use to relieve want, distress, disease, and shall-con-
stitute public use. 
(3) The owner of property taken or used pursuant to this section shall be com-
pensated in accordance with the applicable procedures established in Title 78, 
Chapter 34, and paid out of the general fund as provided in section 63-5a-10 or 
such other special fund as may be authorized by the legislature. 
(4) Nothing in this section applies to or authorizes compensation for the 
destruction or damage of standing timber or other property in order to provide 
a fire break or to the release of waters or the breach of impoundments in order 
to reduce pressure or other danger from actual or threatened flood. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 253, § 8. 
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CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
63-30-4. • Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of 
waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limita-
tions on personal liability. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — 
Exception. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee 
— Exceptions — Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth amendment 
rights. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service — Legal disability. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for filing notice. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time for filing action against govern-
mental entity. 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Application of Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. . . . . ' - . 
63-30-21. Repealed. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state — Presentment for payment. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political 
subdivisions. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims, judgments or insurance 
premiums. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase or self-insurance by governmental entity autho-
rized — Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employees outside scope 
of empio\ ment. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not in compliance with act. 
6o-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or renewal. 
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63-30-1 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized — No right to indem-
nification or contribution from governmental agency. 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee — Insurance 
coverage exception. 
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan — Providing coverage — Expenses of attorney gen-
eral in representing state or employees. 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — Request — Cooperation — Payment of judg-
ment. 
63-30-37. Recovery oi judgment paid and defense costs by government employee. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required. 
63-30-1. Short t i t le . 
Cross-References. 
Voluntary services for public entities, 
immunity from liability, 63-30b-l to 63-30b-4. 
Application of act. 
Governmental Immunity Act applies only 
to entities and does not include the entities' 
employees. Cornwall v. Larsen (1977) 571 P 
2d 925. 
This act applies only to governmental enti-
ties and does not affect the personal liability 
of individuals for their own torts. Madsen v. 
State (1978) 583 P 2d 92. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §2; 1973, ch. 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; 
1983, ch. 129, § 2. 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental immunity is not a defense 
to equitable claims. Bowles v. State, By and 
Through Dept. of Transportation (1982) 652 P 
2d 1345. 
Law Reviews. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 649. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered 
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 495. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment inserted "public 
transit district, redevelopment agency" in 
subd. (2); substituted "for which the entity 
may be liable" at the end of subd. (5) for "as 
63-30-2. Definitions. As used in this aefc chapter: 
(1) Tke- word " s t a t e " sfta& mean "State" means tne state of Utah ^ and 
includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, 
hospital, college, university or other instrumentality thereof of the state; 
(2) 55ie words "political "Political subdivision" shall mean means any county, 
city, town, school discrict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special 
improvement or taxing district, or a s y other political governmental subdivision or 
public corporation; 
(3) 3-he words "governmental "Governmental entity" shall mean means the 
state and its political subdivisions as denned herein; 
(4) Tke word "employee" shall mean "Employee*' means any officer, employee, 
or servant of a governmental entity
 r whether or not compensated, including student 
teachers certificated in accordance with section 53-2-15, educational aides, students 
engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of an approved 
medical, nursing, or other, professional health care clinical training program, 
volunteers and tutors; 
(5) ? k e word "claim'' shall mean "Claim" means any claim brought or cause 
of action for money or damages against a governmental entity or k s against an 
employee ter w-nien rfte entity msy- ae liable; 
(6) :Pke word "Injury'1 "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or 
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may surfer to his person, or 
estate, that would be actionable if indicted by a private person or his agent; 
(1) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage: 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of. any right, title, estate, _or 
interest in reai or personal property. 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-3 
permitted by this act"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1981 amendment inserted "students 
engaged in providing services to members of 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment substituted "results 
from * * * health care facility" for "may 
result from the activities of said entities 
wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise 
and discharge of a governmental function"; 
and made a minor change in phraseology. 
The 1981 amendment added "and from an 
approved medical * * * or private facilities" 
to the end of the section. 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental immunity is not a defense 
to equitable claims. Bowles v. State, By and 
Through Dept. of Transportation (1982) 652 P 
2d 1345. 
Extent of immunity. 
Classification of operation of governmental 
entity as ''governmental function" does not 
signal unconditional immunity under this 
section since the grant of immunity is 
expressly subjected to operation of other sec-
tions of this act. Frank v. State (1980) 613 P 
2d 51". 
Golf courses. 
Operation of a public golf course is not 
essential to governing and is therefore not a 
governmental operation with result that city 
is not immune from tort liability related to 
its operation of golf course. Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City Corp. (1980) 605 r 2d 1230. 
Health care facilities. 
While 1978 amendment was not expressly 
made retroactive, the Supreme Court was 
disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to 
disregard the obvious manifestation of legis-
lative intent reflected in the amendment; for 
that reason, the court held, in a case which 
arose prior to the amendment, that operation 
of a governmentally owned health care facil-
ity such as a university medical center was a 
"governmental function" as contemplated by 
the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program" in subd. (4). 
the statute prior to amendment. Frank v. 
State (1980) 613 P 2d 517. 
Personal liability. 
The Governmental Immunity Act has no 
application to individuals; however, under 
common-law principles, a governmental 
agent performing a discretionary function is 
immune from suit for injury arising there-
from, but an employee acting in a ministerial 
capacity is not so protected; psychologist 
working with university medical center on 
contractual basis and alleged to have been 
negligent in his treatment of suicidal patient 
v.-p.s performing ministerial rather than dis-
cretionary acts, and thus was not afforded 
immunity from suit. Frank v. State (1980) 
613 P 2d 517. 
Proprietary or governmental function. 
The state's operation of a hospital at a 
prison facility for treatment of prisoners is a 
governmental function. Madsen v. State 
(1978) 583 P 2d 92. 
Recreational opportunities provided by 
city. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a 
negligence action against a city for injuries 
sustained by a child when child's sled col-
lided with a post on a city owned golf course 
that was open to the public for sledding in 
the winter months. Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp. (1981.) 629 P 2d 432. 
Sewer system backups. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to 
an action by property owner against city for 
damage sustained when water backed into 
his home due to city's alleged negligence in 
maintaining the sewer system. Thomas v. 
Clearfield City (1982; 642 P 2d 737. 
Subdivision plan approval. 
City was immune from a damage suit 
based on its refusal to approve a subdivision 
plan, since its actions were deemed to be a 
"governmental function." Seal v. Mapleton 
City (1979) 598 P 2d 1346. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. Except as may be oth-
erwise provided in this act, all governmental entities are immune from suit for 
any injury which re su l t s from the exercise of a governmenta l function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
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63-30-4 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
Test for determining governmental immu- (19S0) 605 P 2d 1230. overruling Jopes v. Salt 
nity. Lake County (19591 9 U 2d 297, 343 P 2d T2S. 
Test for determining governmental immu- T e s t f o r determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under considera- ™ty 1S whether the activity unaer considera-
tion is of such a unique nature that it can t l o n 1S 0 I s u c n a u n i ( 4 u e n a t u r e t h a t I I can 
only be performed bv a governmental agencv onl>' b e periormed by a governmental agency, 
or that it is essential to the core of govern- referring not to what government may do but 
mental activity; this new standard broadens to wnat government aione must do. or that it 
governmental liability, however, the oosition is essential to the core or governmental activ-
is consistent with the plain legislative intent Ky, reiernng to those activities not unique m 
of this chapter to expand governmental lia- themselves but essential to the performance 
bilitv. Standiford v. Salt Lake Citv Corp. oi those activities that are uniquely govern-
mental. Johnson v. Salt Lake Citv Corn. 
(1981) 629 P 2d 432. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — 
Effect of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — 
Limitations on personal liability. (1] Nothing contained in this aes chapter, unless 
specifically provided, is *e shall be construed as an admission or denial of liability 
or responsibility in so far as governmental entities or their employees are con-
cerned. Wherein If immunity from suit is waived by this aes chapter, consent to 
be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any immu-
nity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert 
under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmenta l entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is, 
after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding 
b> reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the employee acted 
or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud; or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in 
a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee sh-all may be held personally 
liable for acis or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, unless it is 
established that the employee acted or failed to act due to gross negligence, fraud 
or malice. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1973, ch. 27, Compilers Notes. 
§ 3; 1983, ch. 129. § J. The 197S amendment added the second and 
third paragraphs. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. Immunity from 
suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation and 
actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the 
requirements of sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 63-30-19 e£ rh±s aet. 
History: L. 1965. ch. 139. § 5: 1975, ch. Compiler's Notes. 
189, § 1; 197S. ch. 27. § 4; 1983. ch. 129, § 4.
 T h e 1978 amendment inserted "63-30-11" 
near the end of the section. 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor 
vehicles — Exception. Immunity from suit of ail governmental entities is '^aived 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-10 
for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehi-
cle or other equipment during the performance of his duties, while t» within the 
.scope of h*s employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this 
section shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as denned by law 
and while being driven in accordance with the requirements of section 41-6-147 
T 11U n I A n o A n n n f n t r n 1 Or\5? <yq n m nr\c\ c\A i u t p n n p » " » C ^ T n*-,rn s\* T T » >-> \-< 1 H£?1 
XJ l i i n u u u i zTrrntTCJxrtrtt xtrtrof tttr ztrrrcTitrctr t ry c r i i i p i c " nny j u a w s OT U l u l l , xtrux. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §7; 1983, ch. 
129, §5. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, etc. 
Discretionary function. nity to the state in a tort action alleging dan-
The design of a system of traffic-control gerously designed, constructed and main-
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy tained electric traffic-control semaphore 
making level" nor constitute a discretionary caused an auto accident resulting in personal 
act for which 63-30-10 would provide immu- injury. Bigelow v. Ingersoll (1980) 618 P 2d 
50. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous, etc. 
Latent defective condition. discoverable by a reasonable inspection was 
Defect in a county storm drain that was n o t a latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake 
County (1978) 583 P 2d 105. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omis-
sion of employee — Exceptions — Waiver for injury caused by violation of 
fourth amendment rights. (1) Immunity from suit of ail governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused, or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interfer-
ence with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights, or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the fail-
ure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization, or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or bv reason cf making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection oi any property, or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether or not such is 
negligent or intentional, or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstra-
tions, mob violence and civil disturbances, or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes, 
or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard, or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or 
city jail or other place of legal confinement, or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any activity 
authorized by the state land board. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights 
as provided in Chapter 16 of Title 78 which shall be the exclusive remedy for inju-
ries to those protected rights. If section 78-16-5 or subsection 77-35-12(g) or any 
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63-30-11 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this subsection (2) shall be void 
and governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of fourth 
amendment rights. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1982 amendment designated the 
former section as subsec. (1); substituted let-
ters for numbers as subdivision designations; 
and added subsec. (2). 
Discretionary function. 
The design of a system of traffic-control 
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy 
making level" nor constitute a discretionary 
act for which this section would provide 
immunity to the state in a tort action alleg-
ing dangerously designed, constructed and 
maintained electric traffic-control semaphore 
caused an auto accident resulting in personal 
injury. Bigeiow v. Ingersoll (1980) 618 P 2d 
50. 
False arrest. 
City was immune from suit where plaintiff 
was arrested on a bench warrant due to city 
court clerk's failure to enter in the docket 
book that plaintiff had paid his fine. Conneil 
v. Tooele City (1977) 572 ? 2d 697. 
Incarceration in state prison. 
The exception of the waiver of governmen-
tal immunity for injuries arising out of the 
incarceration of a person in the state prison 
does not constitute a denial of equal protec-
tion nor is it against public policy. Madsen v. 
State (1978) 583 P 2d 92. 
This section barred a wrongful death 
action against the state and board of correc-
tions for death of a prisoner due to alleged 
negligent treatment of the prisoner after 
surgery in the prison hospital. Madsen v. 
State (1978) 583 P 2d 92. 
State is immune under subdivision (10) of 
this section from claim of inmate for negli-
gent deprivation of property, but individual 
employees of the state are not immune. 
Schmitt v. Billings (1979) 600 P 2d 516. 
Individual agents' immunity. 
Under subdivision (10) of this section, indi-
vidual defendants are not immune from lia-
bility for their own torts. Schmitt v. Billings 
(1979) 600 P 2d 516. 
Psychologist working with university med-
ical center on contractual basis and alleged 
to have been negligent in his treatment of 
suicidal patient was acting in a ministerial 
rather than discretionary capacity and thus 
was not immune from suit. Frank v. State 
(1980) 613 P 2d 517. 
Sale of recovered stolen property. 
Where plaintiffs motorcycle was stolen, 
recovered, held for trial of alleged thief, then 
sold by state tax commission without notice 
to plaintiff (who never received notice letter), 
the motorcycle's sale did not involve such 
exercise of "basic policy evaluation" as to 
make it a discretionary decision under subdi-
vision (1) of this section, but rather the deci-
sion to sell was an operation function and 
not immune from attack; also, since defend-
ant tax commission never claimed taxes were 
owing on the motorcycle and no taxes were 
deducted from the sale price, and since the 
motorcycle was baing heid as evidence in a 
criminal prosecution, the commission could 
not claim immunity on basis of the tax 
exception under subdivision (8) of this sec-
tion. Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp. (1979) 
600 P 2d 553. 
University rredical centsr. 
State's immunity from suit was waived 
urdor this section ir action alleging negli-
gent treatment of suicidal patient by psychi-
atrist and psychologist at university medical 
center. Frank v. State (1980) 613 P 2d 517. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service — Legal dis-
ability. (1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that would 
apply if the claim were against a private person commences to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury m person* or property against a gov-
ernmental entity or its against an employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall, before maintaining an action under tms- aet, tile a written notice 
of ciaim with such entity for appropriate relief including money damages. 5ke 
notice e* claim shall set forth a- brief statement e£ fcbe facta aft4 tke nature e£ 
SJCL f^c r* I ffc 1 YY\ *** *-i m-<-v »»+• *"n-4 •» ^ f t i 1 V-v^ v /-i * .*i#«*% s\ M W i > 4* w A v* *-v »>^ -i ^ •*% -»*wt s\ 1 r \ ** s~* » U A .-k 1 r^  i yw\ A M n n / \ > n -yw y-w %* *-« ^ »•» ' .-^  
r r r c vTcrmT a j j ^ i LLU? J I ICHI TTTT dii£Xi"U TTJT trrnr p n J U I I ixmxviiii* TTTTT victim TTT jutj.ii p c i d u n 3 
agent, attorney; parent or legal guardian, -&«€ shall -be directed -aftti delivered -ee 
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ijfl section 63-30-12 the responsible governmental entity within -the -fcwne • 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts, the nature 
°1 $hl claim asserted, and the damages incurred by the claimant jso _far jis rhey 
are known, shali be signed by the person making the ciaim or such person's agent, 
attorney, parent or legal guardian, and snail be directed and delivered to the 
responsible governmental entity in the manner and within the time prescribed in 
section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. as applicable. 
Service e£ the notice m claim upon •&» employee -ei -a governmental entity 4s -sot 
a- condition precedent $e the commencement m aft action ef special proceeding 
against st*eh person. M aft action or special proceeding *s commenced against the 
employee, htrt set against the governmental entity, service m the notice of claim 
tipeft the governmental entity is required -eftiy -if the entity has -a statutory 4t*ty 
te lnucmniiy sucn person. 
(4) Ift at the time the claim arises, the claimant is under the age of majority, 
or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the tk»e 
tne cause of action accrued, upon application by the claimant and after hearing 
and notice to the governmental entity the court, in its discretion, may extend the 
time for service of notice of claim; ; but in no event shall it grant an extension 
which exceeds the applicable general statutory period ef limitation applicable te 
the cause el action statute of limitations. In determining whether to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim 
will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on 
the merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment rewrote this section. 
For prior version, see parent volume. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for filing notice. A 
claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and 
the agency concerned within one year after the cause of action claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under subsection 63-30-11(4). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §12; 1978, ch. 
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1973 amendment deleted "or any 
agency thereof" after "state" near the begin-
ning of the section; and made minor changes 
in phraseology. 
Compliance with section. 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
they filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the 
same day they filed the original complaint 
with the court, and amended complaint alleg-
ing compliarce with the Governmental 
Immunity Act was filed, as a matter of right, 
within one year after denial cf the claim cr 
after the end of the 90-day period in which 
the claim is deemed to have been denied. 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office 
(1980) 621 P 2d 1234. 
Quiet title actions. 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies 
with this section if it is given not more than 
one year after plaintiff's right to possession 
has been disturbed or encroached upon by 
the state. Ash v. State (1977) 572 P 2d 1374. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for fil-< 
ing notice. A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an 
3££ 21 omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of ciaim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the cause 
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ot action claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under subsection 63-30-11(4). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment rewrote this section. 
For prior version, see parent volume. 
Claims barred. 
Trial, court properly dismissed complaint 
against county where notice of the claim was 
not filed with the county commission during 
the year following plaintiffs discover,' of her 
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter (1980) 617 P 2d 352. 
Claims by minors. 
Failure of a minor to give notice within the 
time provided in this section does not bar the 
minor's claim as the time for notice is toiled 
during minority by 78-12-36. Scott v. School 
Board of Granite School Dist. (1977) 568 P 2d 
746. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time for filing action 
against governmental entity. If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances 
where in which immunity from suit has been waived as in this ae£ provided 
chapter. Sat4 The action must be commenced within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified herein in this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §15; 1983, ch. 
129, § 6. 
Amended complaint. 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
they filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the 
same day they filed the original complaint 
with the court, and amended complaint alleg-
ing compliance with the Governmental 
Immunity Act was filed, as a matter of right, 
within one year after denial of the claim or 
after the end of the 90-day period in which 
the claim is deemed to have been denied. 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office 
(1980) 621 P 2d 1234. 
Estoppel. 
Governmental entity was not estopped 
from asserting the statute of limitations on 
the basis that an adjustor of its insurance 
carrier "lulled" plaintiff into delay where 
plaintiff was at all times represented by an 
attorney. Cornwall v. Larsen (1977) 571 P 2d 
925. 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Application of 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district courts shall have exclusive original juris-
diction over any action brought under this aefe chapter, and such actions shall be 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in bo far as they are consistent 
with this act chaDter. 
History: 
129, § 7. 
L. 1965, ch. 139, § 16; 1983, ch. 
District court jurisdiction. 
The district court had exclusive, original 
jurisdiction of an action by the former chair-
man and director of the state liquor control 
commission for attorneys' fees incurred in 
the successful defense of twelve indictments 
issued against him for alleged acts or omis-
sions committed in his official capacity since 
ihis section is not in conflict with Art. VII, 
§ 13 of the Utah Constitution. Hulbert v. 
State (1980) 607 P 2d 1217. 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. Actions against the state may be brought in the 
county in which the cause ei action claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions 
against a county may be brought in the county in which the cause m action claim 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge 
of the defendant county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Sakt 
tet** Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions against all other political subdivi-
sible including cities and towns, 3hall be brought in the county in which ?**& the 
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political subdivision is located or in the county in which the cause ef action claim 
arose. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §17; 1983, ch. 
129, §8. 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. A political subdivision, after 
conferring with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such officer, may 
compromise and settle any action as to the damages or other relief sought. 
The risk manager in the department of finance administrative services may; 
when authorized ^ tb 36 -by -ehe board -df examiners, compromise and settle 4&f 
aft amount ftet w exceed 810,000 any claim for damages filed against the state 
under this chapter, UD to and including $10,000 for which the risk management 
fund may be liable, and may, with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative aft4 £ke board e£ examiners, and the executive director of the 
department of administrative services, compromise and settle lor aft amount 
exceeding $10,000 o» sooh- a claim for damages in excess of S10.00Q for which the 
risk management fund may be liable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch. § 13. For provisions concerning the risk man-
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320, § 54. ager in the department of administrative ser-
vices, see 63-1-45 et seq. 
Compiler's Notes. The 1981 amendment substituted "A politi-
Sections 63-2-90 and 63-2-91, concerning cal subdivision" for "The governmental 
the risk manager in the department of entity" in the first paragraph; and added the 
finance, were repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 257, second paragraph. 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity, etc. 
Judgment against governmental entity a claim against an employee; claim against 
required. an employee was not barred where claim 
There must first be a judgment against the against the entity was dismissed for failure 
governmental entity before this section bars t 0 file it within the prescribed time limits. Cornwall v. Larsen (1977) 571 P 2d 925. 
63-30-21. Repealed. 
Repeal. United States or any state, territory, nation 
Section 63-30-21 (L. 1965, ch. 139, §21), or governmental entity, was repealed by 
prohibiting claims u.ider the act by the Law 1978, ch. 27, ? 12. 
63-30-^3. Payment of claim or judgment against state — Presentment for 
payment. Any claim approved by the state as defined herein by subsection 
63-30-2(5) or any final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to 
the state risk manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other instrumentality 
involved for payment if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted 
by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or claim shall 
be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as provided 
in section 63-6-lOy Utah- Gode Annotated, i££3. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 23; 1983, ch. 
129, §9. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance 
created by political subdivisions. Any political subdivision may create and main-
tain a reserve fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivisions 
make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment 
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63-30-27 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
of claims against the co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant 
to this aet chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect 
the co-operating subdivisions from any or all risks created by this aet chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 26; 1983, ch. 
129, § 10. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims, judg-
ments or insurance premiums. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the con-
trary, all political subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual property tax 
sufficient to pay any claims, settlements or judgments , or to pay the costs to defend 
against same, or for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a reserve fund 
for the payment of such claims, settlements or judgments as may be reasonably 
anticipated; and there is hereby specifically included any judgment against an 
elected official or employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers 
based upon a claim for punitive damages, provided, that the authority of a political 
subdivision for the payment of such judgments for punitive damages is limited in 
any individual case to $10,000. It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that 
the payments authorized for punitive damage judgments is money spent for a pub-
lic purpose within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, section 5 of the 
Constitution of Utah; or to pay the premium for such insurance as authorized, even 
though as a result of such levy the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law 
is exceeded; provided, that in no event shall such levy exceed one-half mill nor shall 
the revenues derived therefrom be used for any other purpose than those stipulated 
herein. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 27; 1973, ch. the section; deleted "for which no insurance 
165, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 8. coverage can be obtained as authorized and 
Compiler's Notes. provided by chapter 30, Title 63," after 
The 1978 amendment deleted "secured pur- " c i a i m for; Punitive damages" in the first sen-
suant to the provisions hereof after "settle- tence» a n d m a ( i e Elinor changes in pnraseol-
ments or judgments" near the beginning of ogy. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase or self-insurance by governmen-
tal entity authorized — Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance. 
Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insurance: er 
self-insure^ cr self-insure and purchase e/c°3s commercial insurance m ixcess of 
the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this 
^es er fcy sections 63-48-1 -through 63-48-7 chapter or any ^enon for which a govern-
mental entity or its employee may be held liable. 
^ III addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental 
entity supported m whoie ef m p&rt from federal sources may self-insure with 
respect to specified classes of claimsT m accordance *m& applicable federal regula-
tions, by establishing a trust account under the management of an independent 
private trustee having authority with respect to claims of that character to expend 
both principal and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investiga-
tion, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees, 
and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or 
for which a compromise settlement may be agreed upon. The monies and interest 
earned on said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant to the State 
Money Management Act 51 i 4 to 51-7-2 and shall be subject to audit by the state 
auditor. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust agreement between the 
governmental entity and the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ counsel 
to defend actions against the entity and its employees and to protect and safeguard 
the assets of the trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, 
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to employ expert witnesses and consultants, and to provide such other services and 
functions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the trust. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §28; 1978, ch. 
27, § 9; 1979, ch. 94, § 1; 1983, ch. 130, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment substituted "or self-
insure against any risk created by this act" 
for "against any risk which may arise as a 
result of the application of this act" in the 
first paragraph; and made a minor change in 
phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment inserted "commer-
cial" in the first paragraph; added "or by sec-
tions 63-48-1 through 63-48-7" to the* first 
paragraph; and added the second paragraph. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 12 of Laws 1978, ch. 27 provided: 
"Sections 63-30-21 and 63-30-30, Utah Code 
Annotateu 1953, as enacted by chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, section 10-7-77, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
10, Laws of Utah 1973, and section 10-7-78, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, are repealed." 
Right to hire legal counsel. 
This section provides University of Utah 
Hospital with authority to hire independent 
legal counsel; this section does not violate 
attorney general's authority under Art. VII, 
§ 16 of the state constitution and provides an 
exception to the general authority of the 
attorney general to perform legal services for 
any agency of state government. Hansen v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd. (1982) 652 P 2d 
1332. 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey - 1979,1980 Utah 
L. Rev. 155. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 63-30-29 (L. 1965, ch. 139, §29; 
1978, ch. 27, § 10), relating to provisions of 
liability insurance policies, was repealed by 
Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 5. 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employ-
ees outside scope of employment. A governmental entity that owns vehicles 
driven by employees of the governmental entity with the express or implied consent 
of the entity, but which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of an automo-
bile accident, is not being driven and used within the course and scope of the 
driver's employment is deemed to provide the driver with the insurance coverage 
required by Chapter 41, Title 31, and is deemed to provide liability coverage by 
the governmental entity in accordance with the requirements of the Safety Respon-
sibility Act (sscrion 41-12-1 e* seq.). In no event, however, shall the limits of the 
liability coverage provided under this subsection be deemed to exceed the minimum 
bodily injury and property limits specified in section 41-12-5. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-29.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 128, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to governmental immunity; 
providing limits on the liability of a govern-
mental entity for the negligence of an 
employee driving a government owned vehi-
cle, but outside the scope of the driver's 
employment. 
This act enacts section 63-30-29.5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1983, ch. 128. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 63-30-30 (L. 1965, ch. 139, §30), 
requiring that any liability policy purchased 
under act include provision whereby insurer 
agreed not to assert defense of sovereign 
immunity and to pay all sums for which it 
would otherwise be liable under policy, was 
repealed by Laws 1978, ch. 27, § 12. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not in compliance 
with act. Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and pur-
chased to insure against any risk which ma}' arise as i result of the application 
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of this aefc chapter, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance 
with the requirements of the ae* chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, 
but shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provi-
sions as would have applied had such policy, rider or endorsement been in full com-
pliance with this aet chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §31; 1983, ch. 
129, § 11. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or renewal. No con-
tract or policy of insurance may be purchased or renewed under this chapter s? 
renewed under f&s aes except upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best bid-
der; except that the purchase or renewal of insurance by the state shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-73. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 32; 1981, ch. Compiler's Notes. 
250, § 7; 1983. ch. 129, § 12. The 1981 amendment added "except that 
the purchase * * * 63-56-73" at the end of the 
section. 
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized — No 
right to indemnification or contribution from governmental agency. A govern-
mental entity may insure any or all of its employees against ati of -&fty « m 
bis liability
 t in whole or in part, for injury or damage resulting from a negligent 
an act or omission i» occurring during the performance of an employee's duties, 
within the scope of &s employment, or under coior of authority, regardless of 
whether or not said entity is immune from suit for said act or omission, and any 
expenditure for such insurance is herewith declared ^o fee for a public purpose. The 
insurer under any contract or policy of insurance pursuant to this section shall 
have no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or 
its insurer employee with respect to any loss or liability covered by the contract 
or policy. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 33; 1979, ch. Compiler's Notes. 
94, § 2; 1983, ch. 130, § 2. The 1979 amendment added the second 
sentence. 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee 
— Insurance coverage exception, (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), 
if a judgment for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee 
whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one per-
son in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if a judgment for property dam-
age against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court shall 
reduce the judgment to that amount. 
(3) If a governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of the 
amounts set forth in subsections (1) and (2), the court shall reduce the amount 
of the judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits of the insurance 
coverage. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-34, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1983, ch. 130, § 3. Laws 1983, ch. 130, § 3 repealed old section 
63-30-34 (L. 1965. ch. 139. §34; 1973. ch. 27, 
§ 11; 1979. ch. 94, § 3), relating to excess judg-
ment-., and enacted new section 63-'>r)-34. 
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Title of Act. amended by Chapter 94, Laws of Utah 1979, 
An act relating to governmental immunity; and section 63-30-35, Utah Code Annotated 
providing options for insurance of govern- 1953, as enacted by Chapter 250, Laws of 
mental entities; increasing limits on judg- Utah 1981; repeals and reenacts section 
ments that may be obtained against govern- 63-30-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
mental entities and employees; and providing amended by Chapter 94, Laws of Utah 1979; 
an effective date. and repeals section 63-30-29, Utah Code 
This act amends sections 63-30-28 and Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
63-30-33, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 27, Laws of Utah 1978. - Laws 19S3. ch. 130. 
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan — Providing coverage — Expenses 
of attorney general in representing state or employees. (1) After consultation 
with appropriate state agencies, the risk manager in the department of finance 
administrative services shall provide a comprehensive liability plan, with limits not 
lower than those set forth in section 6o-o0-29 63-30-34, which will protect the state 
and its indemnified employees from claims and liability. Deductibles and maximum 
limits of coverage shall be determined by the risk manager in consultation with 
the director of finance administrative services. 
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the risk management fund estab-
lished in section 68-2-02 63-1-47, to procure and provide coverage to all state agen-
cies and their indemnified employees, except those specifically exempted by law, and 
shall apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance with section 68-2-Q2 63-1-47. 
Unless specifically authorized by statute to do so, including section 6o-2-92(Qj sub-
section 63-1-47 (9), no agency other than the risk manager may procure or provide 
liability insurance for the state. 
(3) Notwithstanding tne provisions of section 67-5-3 or any other provision of 
this code, the state attorney general may bill the department of finance administra-
tive services for all costs and legal fees expended by the attorney general, including 
attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing the state or any indemnified 
employee against any claim ftled under t&s -aet for which the risk management 
fund may be liable and in advising state agencies and employees regarding such 
claims. The risk manager shall draw funds from the risk management fund for 
this purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-5, enacted by L. Repealing Clause. 
1981, ch. 250, § 8; L. 1983, ch. 130, § 4. Section 5 of Laws 1983, ch. 130 provided: 
"Section 63-30-29, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Compiler s Notes.
 a s J a s t a m e n d e d b y Chapter 27, Laws of Utah 
The provisions of chapter 63-2 for the 1978, is repealed." 
department of finance and the risk manager 
therein were repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 257, Effective Date. 
§13. For present provisions concerning the Section 6 of Laws 1983, ch. 130 provided: 
division of finance and the risk manager, "This act shall take effect July 1, 1983, and 
both in the department of administrative shall only apply to claims which arise on or 
services, see chapter 63-1. after that date." 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — Request — Cooperation — 
Payment of judgment. (1) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee 
against a claim, the employee must make a written request to the governmental 
entity to defend him and must make it within ten days after service of process 
uPon him or within such longer period as would not prejudice the governmental 
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, or conflict with notice requirements 
imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating 
to the risk involved. If the employee fails to make a request or fails to reasonably 
cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity is not required to defend or con-
tinue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement 
Against the employee in respect to the claim. 
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(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the govemJ? 
mental entity shall pay any judgment based upon or any compromise or settlement -
of the claim except as provided in subsection (3). jg 
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under aa 
agreement with the employee that the government entity reservesthe right not" 
to pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement unless it is established that the 
claim arose out of an act or omission occurring during the performance of J^ 
duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-36, enacted by L. This act amends sections 63-30-H 
1983, ch. 131, § 4. 63-30-12, 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated 
T . f l f 4 1953, as last amended by ChaDter 27, Laws o{ 
liueoiAct. . „ . * . , Utah 1978, and section 63-30a-2, Utah Code 
An act relating to indemnification of gov-
 A n n o t a t e d 1953 a s e n a c t e d b y C h a p t e r 245 
ernmental employees; modifying notice
 L f ^ h T . ^ 
requirements for claims against govemmen-
 orT '
 u
 °°; 
tal entities, and applying such requirements 63-o0-o<, and 63-30-38, Utah Code Annotated 
to claims against employees for acts or omis- 1953"> r eP e a l s a n d reenacts section 63-30a-3, 
sions within the scope of employment; pro- ^ t a n C o d e Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
viding for indemnification of officers or Chapter 245, Laws of Utah 1977; and repeals 
employees against whom an information is Chapter 48, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 
filed; and providing a severability clause. 1953. — Laws 1983, ch. 131. 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government 
employee. (1) Subject to subsection 'v2), if an employee pays a judgment entered 
against him, or any portion of it, which the governmental entity is required to pay 
under section 63-30-36, the employee is entitled to recover the amount of such pay-
ment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the governmental 
entity. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee 
against a claim, or does conduct the defense under an agreement as provided in 
subsection 63-30-36(3), the employee may recover from the governmental entity 
under subsection (1) if: 
(a) The employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the judgment 
is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within the scope of his 
employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted the defense in good 
faith; and 
(b) The governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage 
resulted from the fraud or malice of ^he employee. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-37, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 131, § 5. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required. 
If a governmental enticy pays ail or part of a judgment based on or a compromise 
or settlement of a claim against the governmental entity or an employee, the 
employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental entity for the pay-
ment. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-38, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 131, § 6. 
CHAPTER 30a 
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES AND 
COSTS TO OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Section 
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or employee — Reimbursement of attor-
neys' fees and court costs incurred in defense. 
63-30a-3. Request for defense or reimbursement. 
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73-1-8. Duties of owners of ditches - Safe condition - Bridges 
The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall maintain 
tiie same in repair so as to prevent waste of water or damage to the prop-
erty of others, and is required, by bridge or otherwise, to keep such ditch 
canal, flume or other watercourse in good repair where the same crosses 
any public road or highway so as to prevent obstruction to travel or dam-
age or overflow on such public road or highway, except where the public 
maintains or may hereafter elect to maintain devices for that purpose 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 12; R. S. 1933 & 
C. 1943,100-1-3. 
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or construction of improve-
ment to real property—Within seven years.—No action to recover damages 
for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the per-
son, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of con-
struction or construction of such improvement to real property more than 
seven vears^after the completion of construction. 
-^•^iT) "Person' shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or 
any other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall 
mean the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the 
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owners use 
or possession of the improvement on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person 
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed 
to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the peri-
ods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by 
L. 1967, ch. 218, § 1. 
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